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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SPECIAL VERDICTS: RULE 49
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
"Rule 49 should be repealed!'*
"Rule 49 [should] ... be amended to make
compulsory either special verdicts or written
interrogatories in civil jury cases!'**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEm OF STANDARDS IN- RULE 49
Rule 49, adopted in 1938 as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
for the first time explicitly authorized a federal trial judge to order a jury to
return a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories in lieu of the
traditional general verdict. Prior to its adoption, influential commentators had
argued that
[T]he general verdict is not a necessary feature of litigation in civil
actions at law, and... it confers on the jury a vast power to commit
error and do mischief by loading it with technical burdens far beyond
its ability to perform, by confusing it in aggregating instead of segregating
the issues, and by shrouding in secrecy and mystery the actual results
of its deliberations. Every one of these defects is absent from the special
verdict. Why then should not the general verdict in civil cases be abolished
and the special verdict take its place?'
The drafters of the rule, however, seem to have recognized that each of
the three alternatives might be of some value. They left the choice of which
form of verdict to use in a given case to trial judges, but did not provide any
standards or guides to aid in the exercise of this discretion.
Not only did the rule fail to help judges determine when to use the special
verdict, or the general verdict with interrogatories, it also gave little guidance
as to how these procedures were to be implemented. For example, while it
seems certain that section (a), "Special Verdicts," was meant to entitle a
The text of Rule 49 is printed as an Appendix to this Comment.
This Comment is based upon a divisional paper submitted to the Procedure and Ad-
vocacy Division; as a divisional paper it was awarded the 1964 Benjamin Sharps Prize,
for the most meritorious essay by a third year student.
*Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas re the 1963 Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 865, 867 (1963).
**Skldmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 67 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 816 (1948).
1. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YAI= L.J. 253, 261 (1920) [here-
inafter cited as Sunderland].
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party to have each issue of ultimate fact 2 submitted to the jury,8 the section
did not indicate who was to draft the questions, what form they should take,4
or whether the trial judge could properly submit questions of ultimate or evi-
dentiary fact on his own motion. Section (b), "General Verdict Accompanied
by Answer to Interrogatories," left unanswered many of the same questions
raised by section (a), and also failed to give any substantial guidance on the
additional problems raised by the possibility that the answer to an interroga-
tory might be inconsistent with the general verdict. In addition to its notable
lack of standards and guides for trial courts, Rule 49 did not acknowledge the
troublesome questions arising from appellate review of judgments based upon
special verdicts and general verdicts with interrogatories.
Rule 49 authorized a substantial departure from traditional practice, which
could have considerable impact upon the outcome of litigation. In this light,
it is remarkable how little help the rule gives a judge in determining when
and how to use a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories. In
deciding what effect should be given to Rule 49, it is necessary to understand
why the drafters probably chose to leave so much to the discretion of trial
judges. In order to gain this understanding, the rule must be set against its
historical background and the academic criticism current at the time it was
drafted.
II. THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL VERDICTS AND GENERAL VERDICTS
WITH INTERROGATORIES
The two procedures which are now known as the special verdict and the
general verdict with interrogatories have their origin in devices created by
juries in England to protect themselves against the dangers of attaint. A major
forerunner of the modem jury trial was the inquest, introduced into English
law by the Normans.5 Because the jurors selected to hear a case were chosen
for their supposed knowledge of the relevant facts and legal principles in-
2. For ease of presentation, this Comment adopts the labels "evidentiary fact" and
"ultimate fact" often used by commentators on the special verdict in the 1930's. Evidentlary
facts are the myriad of minor happenings which go to make up the events which give rise
to a law suit - did the driver have one or two drinks? was the street dry or damp? was
the pedestrian crossing with the traffic light? etc. Ultimate facts are the composite or con-
clusionary findings which are derived from the evidentiary facts by the application of legal
norms - was the defendant negligent? was his negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury? was the plaintiff contributorily negligent? etc. See text accompanying notes 92-94
infra.
3. See "Evidentiary or ultimate questions?" at notes 69-74 inIra, construing "each
issue of fact" to mean only each issue of ultimate fact.
4. Though the rule specifically mentions two types of questions, it goes on to authorize
"such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as
it [the court] deems most appropriate."
5. See Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32
YA. E L.J. 575 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
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volved, evidence was not presented nor were legal instructions given.0 The
jury's decision was announced in a simple statement of result, with no expla-
nation of what facts were found or rules applied.7 If the judge was convinced
that the jury had erred, he could call a second and larger jury to hear the
case de iwvo. If this second, or attainting, jury's decision differed from that
of the original jury, the verdict would be reversed and the original jurors
severely punished.8 As the choice and application of rules of law was the
major source of potential error, jurors sought, as early as the end of the twelfth
century, to limit their responsibility for decisions of law.0 Instead of stating
simply what the result in a case should be, they would either supplement
this announcement with a list of their factual conclusions, or in a more radical
departure, give only their conclusions of fact.10 If they used the first innova-
tion and the judge subsequently determined that their legal result did not
mesh with their factual conclusions, the verdict would be adjusted, but the
harsh sanctions of attaint might not be applied." By adopting the more radical
course they could avoid completely the burden of finding and applying rules
of law, and, accordingly, eliminate the danger of punishment arising from
mistakes in dealing with law.u
Although these two innovations offered some measure of protection to jurors,
and despite the fact that judges often sought by pleas, threats, and informal
sanctions to persuade juries to return special verdicts, the customary pro-
cedure, which came to be known as the general verdict, did not become ob-
solete. One explanation may be found in the fact that it became usual in many
communities for the attainting jury to reaffirm the original verdict almost
automatically. 4 While the prime motive for avoidance of the general verdict
was thus substantially diminished, the danger inherent in its use was never
wholly absent until attaint became utterly obsolete at the end of the seventeenth
century.15 The persistence of juries in returning general verdicts may be ex-
plained by a community feeling that the jury should stand as a protective
6. See Morgan, passim. See also Farley, The Functions of Instructions, 6-10 (1932)
(unpublished thesis in the Yale Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Farley].
7. Morgan, passin.
8. Id. at 576 & n.3.
9. Id. at 577-82. The right of juries to find special verdicts was declared in Statutes
of Westminister, the Second, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30. This statute also guaranteed the
jury's right to return a general verdict.
10. See Morgan at 577-82. M6organ actually gives five variations, but they may be
reduced to the alternatives stated in the text.
11. The members of the jury might, however, be prosecuted for perjury. Cf. Morgan
at 582.
12. Ibid.
13. See THAYER, A PnauamAny TREATISE ON Evrm.cE 217-18 (1893) [hereinafter
cited as THAYER].
14. See 1 HoLDswo~ri, A IsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 342 (1931). See also Sxrrn,
Com. oF ENGcr.., Bk. 3, ch. 2 (1565), quoted in HomswoRarn op. cit. supra at 163, and
THAYER at 139.
15. See HoswoarH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 342.
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barrier between the people and the King's judges, who administered laws
which were frequently not in tune with the temper of the people.10 Jurors
were forced to balance the dangers of attaint against the cost of capitulation
to the courts of the Crown.17
With the obsolescence of attaint, the special verdict and the general verdict
with special answers gradually changed from protective devices into tools by
which judges could gain more control over the application of rules of law.
Prominent legal theorists had written at least from the beginning of the seven-
teenth century that questions of fact are for the jury and questions of law
for the court 18 but it was not until the nineteenth century that judges in
America were granted a power which, it was assumed, would effectuate this
principle: the power to demand that the jury return a special verdict or a
general verdict with interrogatories3 9 Thayer explains this seeming paradox
in the following manner:
While logic and neatness of legal theory have always called aloud, at
least in recent centuries for special verdicts ... considerations of policy
have called louder for leaving the jury free hand .... That body always
represented the people and came to stand as the guardians of their liberty;
so that whether the court or jury should decide a point could not be
settled on merely logical grounds, it was a question deeply tinged with
practical considerations. 20
As protection from government came to seem less important after the Revo-
lution, and as the feeling grew that control of the jury might be as necessary
to the protection of liberty as the system of trial by jury itself,21 the courts,
rather than relying on the old protective devices which had fallen into desuetude,
drew upon the traditional English practice of quizzing the jury on its verdict.-2
The practice was extended to allow a judge to submit special questions to
the jury before it retired to deliberate.28 The judge could not only order a
16. Cf. Farley at 12-15; THAYER at 218-19.
17. The belief that jurors ought to continue to use the general verdict to maintain
some control over the law may have been one of the reasons why attainting juries came to
encourage the choice of the general verdict by failing to bring in verdicts which would
lead to punishment. See PROFFATT, TRIAL By Jua" 36, 60-62 (1880) ; SrOONnR, AN ESSAY
ON THE TRIAL By Juny 110, 112 (1852).
18. See, e.g., 1 COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON bk. 2, ch. 12, § 234 (15th ed,
1794).
19. Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases, 35 YALE LJ. 296, 297-98
(1925) [hereinafter cited as Wicker].
20. THAYER at 218.
21. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VEuIcrs AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 9 (1905) [here-
inafter cited as CLEMENTSON]; Note, Relations between Judge and Jury in the Ninclecnlh
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
22. Quizzing of the jury, apparently first undertaken by judges as an alternative to
calling an attainting jury (Morgan at 576 n.3), and subsequently used in deciding whether
to order a new trial and in discovering essential questions of fact omitted by a jury in re-
turning a special verdict (Morgan at 591; Wicker at 297), was adopted in the nineteenth
century by American courts (Morgan at 592; Wicker at 297).
23. See Morgan at 592; Wicker at 297-98.
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new trial if he determined that the answers were inconsistent with the verdict,
but he could also render judgment contrary to the verdict if the answers
themselves would support such a judgment2 4 From this development it was
an easy step to allow judges to demand that the jury state only its findings
of fact 2 5 The development of these new procedures was much faster on the
eastern seaboard than elsewhere, 26 but by 1925 a majority of the states had
authorized use of the special verdict and the general verdict with interroga-
tories as alternatives to the standard general verdict.2 7 Several federal courts,
although not bound to follow state practice in this area, had also adopted
the new procedures, relying on evolution of the common law for authority3P
Although the new procedures had been widely authorized by 1925, they
had not flourished. 9 Many commentators argued that the chief cause of the
moribund status of the special verdict lay in the numerous pitfalls its tech-
nical requirements presented to litigants.30 A small group of states had at-
tempted to eliminate this problem by enacting reforms designed to make the
process more flexible, but these reforms do not seem to have increased the
popularity of the special verdict. 1 The general verdict with interrogatories
never suffered from the formalism which characterized the special verdictm
yet it also failed to gain any measure of popularity.3 Those commentators
who argued that excessive rigidity was responsible for the unpopularity of
the special verdict sought to explain the similar unpopularity of the general
verdict with interrogatories on the ground that it could produce only the
negative result of undermining the general verdict.34 They ignored the fact
that a court could render final judgment, contrary to the general verdict, on
the basis of the jury's answers to the special questions. Thus the commen-
tators' argument seems to fall short of, an adequate e-x-planation for the negli-
gible inroads made by the special verdict and general verdict with interroga-
tories upon common trial practice. The failure of the new procedures to catch
on rapidly may more realistically be attributed to the continued force of the
belief that the jury should be free to use the general verdict as a means of
24. See Wicker at 298.
25. Ibid. See also Sunderland at 257-58 & nn.12, 13.
26. CLE.ENTsoN at chs. 2 & 3; Wicker at 296.
27. CLEmENIsoN at 9; Wicker at 298.
28. Grand Trunk West. Ry. v. Lindsay, 201 Fed. 836 (7th Cir. 1912), aff'd, 233 U.S.
42 (1914); Victor-American Fuel Co. v. Peccarich, 209 Fed. 568 (8th Cir. 1913), cert.
denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914). See Wicker at 300 & nn.26, 27.
29. Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715, 716-17 (1927) [here-
inafter cited as Green].
30. See, e.g., ibid.; Sunderland at 261-62.
31. Dean Green claimed that the special verdict was enthusiastically received in the
states which made it a less formalistic device, but he presented no evidence in support of
this claim. Green at 716.
32. See Wicker at 301.
33. See Green at 716.
34. Ibid.
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neutralizing harsh laws, and, in general, dispensing "rough justice." Though
few articulated this position it undoubtedly continued to color the problem
as it had for several centuries before.35 Mere habit may also have played
some role in preventing widespread use of special verdicts.
Another explanation for the failure of either of the new procedures to gain
wide acceptance can be found in Sunderland's much-quoted article, Verdicts,
General and Special.36 He argued that,
The real objection to the special verdict is that it is an honest portrayal
of the truth .... [T]he great technical merit of the general verdict...
[is that it] covers up all the shortcomings which frail human nature is
unable to eliminate from the trial of a case. In the abysmal abstraction
of the general verdict concrete details are swallowed up, and the eye of
the law, searching anxiously for the realization of logical perfection, is
satisfied. In short, the general verdict is valued for what it does, not for
what it is. It serves as the great procedural opiate, which draws the cur-
tain upon human errors and soothes us with the assurance that we have
attained the unattainable.87
Sunderland claimed that the use of. the special verdict or general verdict
with interrogatories would point out the weaknesses of the process of trial
by jury, undermine the popular myth that the jury is the perfect fact-finder,
and destroy the prevailing public confidence in trial by jury. But Sunder-
land's own observation as to the underlying basis for the general verdict's
popularity suggests that judges and lawyers who were themselves bound by
the myth of the jury could not have been enthusiastic about procedural inno-
vations which came as thinly disguised attacks on the system of trial by jury
as they knew it. As Judge Frank has pointed out, members of the legal pro-
fession are staunch defenders of legal cmyths.-8 While we cannot picture the
advocate in the heat of trial consciously sacrificing a tactical advantage in
order to preserve the jury myth, we can visualize him as a person whose
attitude is shaped by the popular myth - one who has confidence that things
should be left to the jury's wisdom. Thus it would not have been a question
of sacrificing a recognized advantage, but rather an inability to see beyond
the general verdict and a comfortable familiarity with that procedure, which
caused lawyers to ignore the alleged potential of the new procedures.
III. THE COMMENTATORS
During the 1920's and 30's, while the public and the legal profession seemed
content with the traditional role of the jury, a prominent group of commen-
tators launched an open attack on the process of trial by jury as it then stood.
They envisioned an ideal system in which rules of law would be intelligently
35. See THAYR at 218-19; 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAc'rxcE 49.05, at 2217 (2d ed,
1951).
36. 29 YALE L.. 253 (1920).
37. Id. at 262.
38. LAw ,ND THE MODERN MIND ch. 1 et Passitu (1949).
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and carefully applied to factual determinations made by a rational and con-
scientious finder of facts. The system would produce results as good as the
applicable substantive law, with a minimum of delay and expense. Against
this ideal they held up the traditional process of trial by jury, and found it
sorely wanting. The failure of reality to approach any of the attributes of
the ideal, they argued, was not inherent in the process of trial by jury, but
rather could be attributed to a single cause - the use of the general verdict.
A. The Case Presented by the Commentators
The commentators 89 asserted that use of the general verdict was an invi-
tation to the jurors to act irresponsibly, to ignore the judge's instructions, and
to render a verdict in accord with their feelings rather than with the law and
the facts of the case. The merger of fact and law in the general verdict also
made it impossible for courts to exercise control over irresponsible jurors
because there was no way to tell what facts had been found nor what law
had been applied; indeed, it was impossible to know whether a jury even
bothered with facts or law. Lawyers, aware of the potential irresponsibility
of jurors, concentrated more on building up sympathy for their clients and
creating favorable images for themselves than on presenting evidence for a
factual inquiry. Further, the general verdict and the trial practices it fostered
made it difficult for even the conscientious juror to perform his role responsibly.
Evidence was presented in a jumbled fashion, and there was no effective de-
vice for focusing the jury's inquiry on the critical issues in a case. The charge,
which was supposed to provide such focus, was in fact often rambling and
incomprehensible to the average juror. The inability of jurors to understand
the law as stated in the instructions often drove them, out of frustration, to
vote for the party they liked best, or to resort to decision by the "flip of a
coin." In summary, the commentators urged that the use of the general ver-
dict poisoned the process of trial by jury because factual issues were not
dearly framed, the charge produced confusion, the process courted bias and
emotion, and the secrecy of the jury room precluded judicial enforcement of
jury responsibility. But the commentators adduced no proof in support of these
charges.
The commentators also directed their attention to the practical difficulties
attending trial by jury. It was perfectly obvious that the traditional process
was slow and expensive. They claimed that the complex general charge was
the source of a tremendous amount of appellate litigation and the cause of
39. See Sunderland; Green; Wicker; Coleman, Advantages of Social Verdict, 13
J. Aa. Jur. Soct, 122 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Coleman]. See also, for similar com-
ment following the adoption of Rule 49, FRArN, CoUrrs o N TRIAL 127-40 (1949); LiUp
scomb, Special Verdicts under the Federal Rules, 25 WA H. U.L.Q. 185 (1940) [here-
inafter cited as Lipscomb]; Ilsen & Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affectcd by the
New Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 MIxNN. L. REv. 1 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Ilsen
& Hone]; Note, 34 111- L. REv. 96 (1939); Wicker, Trials and New Trials under the
New Federal Rules, 15 TEm. L. Rv. 570 (1939).
19651
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frequent new trials. Because of the merger of fact and law, error could not
be localized and corrected by any partial measures. An incorrect instruction,
the improper removal of one issue of fact from the jury, or the failure to
withdraw an issue on which reasonable men could not differ would vitiate
the entire verdict, and the only remedy would be a new trial.
The commentators apparently felt that the argument that there is need for
an institution which can mitigate harsh laws and dispense rough justice was
without merit, and gave it little consideration. They probably shared the views
of Judge Frank in Courts on Trial.40 Frank, who was very much in the com-
mentator tradition, argued that at least in the civil sphere there were no longer
rules of law so harsh or inequitable that a protective barrier between govern-
ment and the people was warranted, and that even if there still were some
such rules, it would be unrealistic to view the jury as a body which attempts
to determine whether a law is "just" or "good." He claimed that in rendering
a general verdict jurors do not act on rules, but rather on impulse, and that
they neutralize excellent as well as harsh rules in a capricious fashion. Finally,
he urged that even if juries do manage to inject a sort of equity into the de-
cision process, they are not the proper institution to make such adjustments.
A jury is not a representative of all the public, and it acts in an ad hoc fashion,
Jury "legislation" runs counter to the principles of representative government
and equal treatment for all before the law. Further, by correcting laws in
individual cases, juries take the pressure off the proper institutions to bring
the rules into line with public sentiment. When a jury neutralizes a law, it
acts as a buffer, and conceals the unjust law from the public. Thus Frank
concluded that the "lay legislature," at least in civil cases, is unnecessary, and
in the long run may be harmful to society.
Having indicted the general verdict, the commentators went on to advocate
the special verdict as a corrective which would bring the process of trial by
jury into line with their model. First, they claimed that the jury would be
confined to its proper role as an impartial, rational finder of fact. The use of
special factual questions would have a strong psychological effect on jurors,
serving as an explicit reminder that their duty as citizens was to act as fact-
finders. Similarly, desire to avoid public humiliation would cause jurors to
sift the evidence dispassionately in search of the facts:
Jurors are ashamed to find a specific fact against the weight of the evi-
dence, for the vice of the finding is generally so obvious that they cannot
justify their action before their neighbors and friends. 41
The questions would also give a focus to the presentation of evidence and to
the jury's deliberations. Finally, lawyers, realizing that jurors would have
40. FRANx, CouRTs oN TRIAL 127-35 (1949). See also the opinion of Judge F-rank
in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 335 U.S. 816
(1948).
41. Coleman at 122.
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to answer questions relating only to the facts, would concentrate on informing
the jurors, not on arousing their passions.
The commentators went on to argue that the use of the special verdict would
relieve the jury of the difficult task of understanding and applying rules of
law. The judge, trained in the law, would select and apply rules to the jury's
fact determinations. As a result, jurors would no longer be able to take law
into their own hands and give decisions on the basis of their own ideas of
justice; nor could they negate law by deciding solely on the basis of preference
for a party or his lawyer. Nor would jurors be motivated to resort to coin
flipping by the frustration which arises from the incomprehensibility of the
general charge. Legal instructions, when needed, would be simple, short and
enlightening. Since jurors would no longer be confused, nor able to control
results directly, they would concentrate on their real job - fact finding.
Finally, the commentators claimed that use of the special verdict would
speed up jury trials and decrease the expense of litigation. Elimination of the
general charge would remove the largest source of appellate litigation and
of new trials. Errors could be localized on appeal and corrected with far less
expense and delay. When an appellate court determined that the trial judge
had erred in his choice or application of a rule of law, the court could either
remand to the trial judge for reconsideration, or correct the error itself. If the
trial court took a question of fact from the jury improperly, or misinstructed
on one question, there would have to be retrial on that single factual question
alone. If the trial judge improperly failed to withdraw one question from the
jury no new trial would be necessary; at most all that would be needed would
be a remand to the trial judge so that he could apply the law to the facts as
corrected. In all these situations the delay and expense of a new trial could
either wholly or partially be eliminated.
On the basis of the reasons they advanced, the commentators argued that
the special verdict should be used in every case; they generally rejected the
general verdict with interrogatories as a half-way compromise not worthy of
consideration.4 Although Rule 49 did authorize the use of the special verdict
by the federal courts, it also authorized the general verdict with interroga-
tories; furthermore, it made neither of the new procedures mandatory. Thus
it is apparent that the drafters of the rule were not so convinced by the com-
mentators' case as to be willing to take the radical step proposed. In retro-
spect, the wisdom of the drafters' decision is apparent, since analysis reveals
substantial weaknesses in the commentators' case.
Psychological impact of the use of special questions. The commentators
claimed that use of special questions would strongly affect the reasoning pro-
42. See Green at 716. Sunderland contains no mention of interrogatories and Judge
Frank, in his discussion of special verdicts in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.RR., 167 F.2d
54, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948), said only: "Rule 49(a) also authorizes
the judge to call for a general verdict accompanied by .vritten interrogatories." But ci.
Wicker.
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cess of jurors, by eliminating irrational approaches to their role. The com-
mentators' case was based on a priori assumptions concerning the human
psyche. But even on the same level of a priori speculation it seems doubtful
that use of special questions alone would have the predicted impact of neutral-
izing the emotions and prejudices of jurors and of restraining the apathetic
or impatient juror from the temptation to compromise or flip coins. One won-
ders whether the mere use of special questions would have any more effect
on a juror inclined to ignore his duty than the cautionary exhortation com-
monly included in the charge given when a general verdict is used. Similarly,
it is not clear how much weight should be given the contention that jurors
would be influenced to answer special questions in a conscientious, deliberate,
and rational fashion by desire to avoid public humiliation.48 Although it is
perhaps true that jurors would feel more susceptible to public criticism when
giving answers to special questions, it is probably also true that jurors are
not usually motivated primarily by a desire to appear rational to the public."
Furthermore, it is not obvious that in attempting to avoid public criticism jurors
will act more responsibly. To the contrary, if jurors try to tailor their answers
to fit their prediction of what the public will deem appropriate, a new element
of irrationality is injected into the process. A juror who thinks primarily of
his community image can hardly be considered responsible - at best he can
be called responsive.
Special verdicts as aids to conscientious jurors. The commentators' assertion
that special questions would give a focus to the deliberations of the jury, by
highlighting the relevant issues in a case is probably true. Likewise, any con-
fusion arising from the jury's responsibility to apply the rules of law given
in the general charge would be eliminated by the use of the special verdict.
However, while the commentators argued that jurors are unable to under-
stand the legal part of a general charge, they ignored the probability that far
more of the confusion engendered by the general charge is due to the legal
43. If a question of fact is so one-sided that any answer but one would be ridiculous
it should be taken from the jury by the trial judge. But it is probable that jurors do not
realize that any question submitted to them can reasonably be answered in more than one
way since the judge has the power to withdraw certain questions from their considera-
tion.
44. It is difficult to believe that the course of jury discussion in the average lawsuit
will be strongly influenced by the jurors' predictions of public reaction. It is only in tho
extraordinarily sensational case that the public has any awareness of the evidence pre-
sented or the issues raised in the litigation. In a typical case, the informed public amounts
to five or ten courtroom spectators, and the average juror is not likely to be swayed by
his appraisal of their reactions. The jurors' neighbors will know little more about his
jury service than what he tells them. Even in the sensational case which does get front
page coverage, it is too easy to assume that jurors will act differently in an attempt to
avoid public criticism. There will still be some whose sole goal will be to get home as
fast as possible, others who wish only to be mentioned in the papers, and some who will
believe that the reaction of the public to the answers of the jury is not something to be
considered by the jurors.
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definitions given than to the rules of law stated by the judge. 5 The commen-
tators intended that questions of ultimate fact - negligence, proximate cause,
last clear chance - would be for the jury; they did not question the traditional
theory that the jury should apply these legal norms, formulated by the court,
to individual fact situations in deciding whether relevant legal standards of
conduct were met by the parties involved in the litigation. But since a finding
of ultimate fact necessarily involves the application of a legal definition to
evidentiary facts, the need for complicated legal instructions would not be
eliminated by use of the special verdict procedure. To be sure, some of the
confusion produced by the general charge might be ameliorated by including
the legal definitions in the written questions submitted;40 nevertheless, the
heart of the problem created by the legal definitions is their complexity and
subtlety - accentuated for the average juror by the esoteric legal language
in which they are cast.
Enforcement of the law-fact dichotomy by use of special verdicts. The com-
mentators' contention that use of the special verdict procedure would pre-
clude juries from usurping the function of the judge by taking the law into
their own hands seems necessarily based on the premise that jurors vill not
know what judgment will follow from their answers. This premise assumes,
first, that the average juror will have no common knowledge of the relation-
ship between the ultimate facts he is called upon to find and the result which
should follow from them. One wonders whether, in many cases, even the
least sophisticated juror would not know which side a given answer would
favor: the average man does not need a lawyer to tell him that if he thinks
the defendant should win in a negligence case he should answer "no" to the
question, "was the defendant negligent?" 47 Second, the premise assumes that
trials can and will be run so as to insulate jurors from knowledge of the
connection between their answers and the judgment in the case. It seems
unlikely that trials could be so antiseptically organized.48 A jury, which in
some way acquires knowledge of the effect its answers will have, can take the
law into its own hands merely by checking off the answers which will lead
to the result it favors.
Even if jurors had no common knowledge, and if the insulation of the
jury during the trial could be assured, there is a further difficulty with the
commentators' argument. Ignorance of the applicable rules of law may not
45. Legal definitions are the statements of the norms which give content to a legal
rule. When the judge states: '7f you find A, B, and C to be so, then you must return
verdict X," he is giving a legal rule to the jury. When he tells the jury how to deter-
mine what A, B, and C are, he is giving the legal definitions. Thus, the legal definitions
are the norms which must be applied to the evidentiary facts in order to derive the ulti-
mate facts which, once a legal rule is applied, will provide a result. Most of the difficulty
in charging a jury consists in giving content to the legal definitions (e.g., negligence).
46. This was suggested in Lipscomb at 205, and would involve a radical departure
from the traditional practice of giving only oral instructions.
47. Even a single sophisticated juror could "contaminate" the whole panel.
48. See "Impact of use of the special verdict on the advocate," at note 49 infra.
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necessarily cause jurors to refrain from attempting to control results and
keep them strictly confined to their role as fact-finders. It may mean only
that they will have to resort to guesswork once they get past the questions
whose import they understand. By such guesswork the jury may negate
rules of law, by chance if not by choice. Thus, although a result-oriented jury's
direct control may be cut back by use of the special verdict, to do so may
actually lead to the multiplication of irrationality, by injecting guesswork
into the jury's attempt to dispense equity justice or to give effect to its pas-
sions and prejudices.
Finally, the commentators again failed to reckon with the fact that even under
the special verdict procedure they envisioned, the jury would continue to have
control of a large proportion of the "law" involved in a case. For as long as
the jury must decide questions of ultimate fact, it has power over the appli-
cation of legal definitions, and can ignore or distort the formulation of ultimate
questions (e.g., the elements of negligence) given by the court. Only if the
radical step of putting only evidentiary questions to the jury were taken, could
the jury be totally removed - even in theory - from the "law" half of a suit.
Impact of use of the special verdict on the advocate. The commentators
argued that counsel, aware of the effect that use of the special verdict procedure
would have on the jury, would concentrate upon informing jurors rather than
on awakening their prejudices and stirring up their emotions. The commen-
tators seem to have assumed that trial lawyers would accept at full value the
case for the special verdict. It seems more likely that lawyers would not be
convinced that the mere use of special questions precludes the possibility
of preying on the passions and prejudices of jurors. If counsel felt the jurors
already understood, or could be made to appreciate, what answers to a par-
ticular question would favor his client, he might still try to "sell" himself,
"damn" his opponent, bolster his client's image, and evoke all possible sym-
pathy and bias. It might be argued that the judge should prevent lawyers
from communicating the requisite information to the jury (though he dearly
could not eliminate the jury's prior knowledge). In order for the court to
be able to prevent lawyers from indicating to the jury what findings would
favor their clients, a radical break with our tradition of adversary advocacy
would be required.49 Not only would forensic argument have to be strictly
controlled, but even the tone in which questions are asked during direct or
cross-examination would be subject to a new objection - "informing" the jury.
Impact of the use of special verdicts on the problem of expense and delay.
The commentators argued that elimination of the general charge - unneces-
sary when a special verdict is used - would remove the greatest source of
appellate litigation from the trial process. Once again, they overlooked the
fact that instructions on legal definitions would still be necessary unless the
jury was to return only evidentiary answers. One wonders whether the major
portion of appellate litigation may not arise from instructions on legal defini-
49. See note 115 infra. See also text at notes 76-77 infra.
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tions, rather than on rules of law. The commentators also argued that use of
the special verdict would be of great aid in eliminating the expense and delay
of new trials. While this claim is undoubtedly true when an appellate court
determines that the trial court erred in the rule of law it applied or in sub-
mitfing a particular question to the jury, since these errors can be corrected
without any retrial, there may be some drawbacks to tis procedure. In either
case, rendering judgment without a new trial may serve to turn on its head
the attempt of a result-oriented jury to dispense rough justice. When an in-
correct rule of law is applied - and if the jurors were not kept in ignorance
of the court's intent to apply that rule - their answers may be result-oriented
and predicated upon the rule which they thought would be applicable. If an
issue was improperly submitted to the jury, and if judgment is subsequently
rendered on the basis of a reversal of the jury's answer to that question taken
together with its answers to other questions, a perverse inversion of the jury's
intent may result in a case in which the answers it gave were interrelated.0
Finally, the commentators claimed that when an appellate court determines
that an issue was improperly withheld from the jury, or that an incorrect
legal definition was given, only a partial retrial on the single question involved
would be required, and substantial savings of time and expense could be
effected. The problem of the possible interrelation of the first jury's set of
answers may arise in this context also. Furthermore, even the claim that sav-
ings of time and expense will be effected may be exaggerated. Once it is recog-
nized that facts are often not easily separated in neat bunches, but are usually
inextricably interconnected, it becomes doubtful whether a separate trial on
a single question might not cause more confusion and delay than an entire
new trial; for example, it is difficult to visualize a new trial on just the ele-
ment of proximate cause or last clear chance in a negligence case.
Special verdicts and the role of the jury. Underlying the commentators' case
was a deep-seated distrust of the jury; indeed, they seem to have considered
the evils of trial by jury so obvious as not to require argument - not until
Judge Frank wrote his Courts on Trial in 1949 was the case against the jury
made explicit and articulate. Without attempting to discover the underlying
causes of the waning esteem for the jury 51 nor to give the various views of
the proper role of the jury in the trial process the careful treatment they de-
serve, it is important to note that there are powerful arguments in support
50. For example, in a negligence case a jury which felt that the defendant should not
be held liable, realizing that a finding of contributory negligence would insure such a
result, might believe that once such a finding was entered it had done enough, and might.
therefore, pay no attention to the remainder of the answers or attempt to answer them in
a manner favorable to the plaintiff so that the judge would not become suspicious of its
motives. If the appellate court determines that the defendant did not produce enough
evidence of contributory negligence for the question to be properly submitted to the jury,
and the jury answered all the other questions in a manner favorable to the plaintiff, the
court would have to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
51. See Note, The Relationship Between Judge and Jury in the Nineteenth Century,
74 YALE L.. 170 (1964).
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of the jury's role in rendering a general verdict to which the commentators
gave little attention.
To begin with, the jury rendering a general verdict must be seen as in
part a political, not a merely legal, institution. This fact has ramifications of
enormous importance which deserve to be thoroughly explored before any
decision can be properly made on the desirability of retaining the general
verdict; indeed, the ramifications are so large that abolition of the central
role of the jury in the legal process should perhaps be accomplished only by
a constitutional amendment. The lack of sophistication of the common man
imposes upon lawmakers the restraint of having to make the law they pre-
scribe for individual behavior understandable to the pdople who will be on
juries: understandable both in its import and in its justice - or at least in
its absence of patent injustice. Whether such a tethering of the law to the
limits of the ordinary man is important or desirable is surely a critical question
in deciding whether to retain the general verdict. Similarly, direct participa-
tion by the people in the process of governing may be significantly responsible
for maintaining the people's sense of identification with their government,
hence in maintaining what may be the sine qua non of democracy 2 The jury
also stands as a potential obstacle to the imposition of harsh or tyrannical laws,
and thus as a potential safeguard of individual liberty. Though we might
agree with judge Frank that at this point in our history there seems to be
little need for this function of the jury, it does not follow that the institution
should not be preserved intact for a day when its protection may be needed
againY3
Most supporters of the general verdict have, however, stressed its impor-
tance as a legal institution. 4 To the generality and logical rigor of rules of
law must be added the flexibility of justice in the particular case. As Wigmore
observed:
Law and justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is
because law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the rules are
general exceptions) ; while justice is the fairness of this precise case
under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law only takes account of
broadly typical conditions, and is aimed on average results, law and
justice every so often do not coincide.
52. See generally 5 Moo E, FEDERAL PRAAc'nCE if 49.05 (2d ed. 1951). See also Green,
Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 485 (1956).
53. See Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas re the 1963 Amend.
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S.
865, 867-68 (1963).
54. See MooRE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1 49.05; Wignore, A Program, for the
Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 166, 170 (1929) ; Pound, Law in Books anld
Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910); Wyzanski, A Trial Jutdges Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1286 (1952); Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the




Everybody knows this, and can supply instances. But the trouble is
that Law cannot concede it. Law - the rule - must be enforced - the
exact terms of the rule, justice or no justice ....
Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular
case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular
satisfaction is preserved. 5
Thus not only is it desirable to have provision for justice as well as law built
into our judicial institutions, it may well be necessary in order to preserve
popular confidence in the legal system.56
Finally, as Professor Moore has pointed out, the case against the jury rests
largely upon exaggerations and generalizations drawn from unique individual
experiences.5W The law is by no means as complicated as the commentators
seemed to assume (and, as we have seen, to the extent that the law is being
nullified by juries because of its complexity, the jury may well be performing
a valuable function). Nor is there convincing evidence to support the con-
clusion that jurors are generally fickle, emotional, irresponsible pavms easily
manipulated by skilled advocates. Much of the criticism leveled at the jury
could be more properly directed at the bench and trial bar. If the general
charge is incomprehensible this may well be the fault of trial judges who treat
it as a formality to be dispensed with quickly and without much preparation.
If jurors are moved by prejudice this may be the fault of advocates more
concerned with immediate victory than with their professional responsibility,
and of the system which encourages them to exploit the weaknesses of jurors.
Lawyers need not be allowed to play upon the emotions of jurors. We have
seen that, if the special verdict is to perform as the commentators intended
it should, strict control over a lawyer's communication to the jury would have
to be imposed;58 theoretically, there is no reason why such control could not
be imposed in the general verdict context.
55. Wigmore, supra-note 54, at 170.
56. Sunderland argues that the general verdict is valued for what it does - conceal
the imperfections of the process and give the public a sense of security. "[The general
verdict] serves as a great procedural opiate, which draws the curtain upon human errors
and soothes us with the assurance that we have attained the unattainable." Sunderland
at 262. But it may be precisely this Delphic quality of the general verdict which is its
greatest virtue. Sunderland assumes that a logical process is the ultimate goal; if so, the
public's confidence in the process may be immaterial. However, because a generally ac-
cepted method of settling disputes effectively and peacefully is essential to the smooth
functioning of a complex society, public confidence in the legal process is critical. The
acceptability of the process may be far more important than its rationality. Thus, perhaps
the "soothing" effects of the "opiate" called the general verdict should not be dismissed
as easily as Sunderland does, since they may be partly responsible for public confidence
in trial by jury, and since there is no assurance that the special verdict procedure would
produce equal confidence.
57. MGoOax, op. cit. .supra note 52, at 49.05.
58. See text at note 48 supra, and text at notes 76-77 infra.
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B. Aspects of the Special Verdict Not Treated by the Commentators.
The arguments advanced in favor of the use of special verdicts seem, on
reflection, not nearly as persuasive as the commentators made them out. Fur-
ther, there are a number of aspects of special verdict procedure which the
commentators failed to discuss.
Use of testing questions. The commentators never argued that when a
special verdict was used the jury should be required to answer questions
directed at every issue of fact raised by the evidence. As we have seen, they
apparently envisioned that questions would be directed primarily at ultimate
facts. Yet it is also possible, when using a special verdict, to require the jury
to answer not only questions of ultimate fact, but also questions directed at
evidentiary facts, or questions which probe the jury's understanding of the
legal definitions involved in its findings of ultimate fact. For example, in a
negligence case one of the ultimate fact questions submitted to the jury would
be, "Was the defendant negligent?" The jury's answer to this question could
be tested in two ways. If an issue of evidentiary fact were critical, a testing
question could be directed specifically at that issue ("Did the defendant go
through a red light?"). A testing question could also be directed at one
of the defining elements of negligence ("Could a reasonable man have fore-
seen any danger arising from his conduct?"). It seems likely from the com-
mentators' arguments in favor of special verdicts that they would have favored
such questions; testing questions tend to narrow the focus of the jury's de-
liberations even further, serve as a means of checking the rationality of those
deliberations, and increase the likelihood that a result-oriented jury will reveal
itself.
When testing questions are used, a court must be prepared to deal with
the problem of inconsistent answers. To begin with, the very difficult problem
of what constitutes material inconsistency " will provide a substantial source
of appellate litigation with its attendant expense and delay. When inconsis-
tency between the answers to an ultimate and a testing question is manifest,
the trial judge can follow one of three courses. In theory, he could render
judgment against the party with the burden of proof on the ultimate question ;cO
but it would be so patently unfair to penalize a party for the jury's mistake
that it is hard to envision this possibility - though quick and cheap - being
seriously entertained. Second, the judge could order the jury to return to
the jury room to reconsider the question, but this course may raise some
new problems. If the jurors were conscientious in their original deliberations,
the realization that they had done something wrong might cause them to
shift focus and concentrate on returning answers which they think will win
59. Cf. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.RL.L, 372 U.S. 108, 118-22 (1963); but see dis-
sent of Stewart and Goldberg, JJ., id. at 124-27.
60. To be precise, of course, "burden of persuasion" is what would be involved.
McCoamcx, EvimxrcE § 308 (1954). According to MAGUiRE, EVmnNcE: Co uo N SrNsv




the favor of the court. For example, if the jury had originally found the de-
fendant negligent, but had answered "no" to the testing question, "Could
the defendant have foreseen any danger?" the jury might be tempted not
to reconsider but simply to change its answer to the testing question. This
possibility is, of course, heightened if the jury is impatient, and made almost
certain if the jury was result-oriented from the beginning. Further, if this
course is followed, the judge must determine what to do if the jury returns
a second time with the same or other inconsistent answers. The third, and
perhaps best means of dealing with inconsistency is to order a new trial
either on the single ultimate fact involved or on the whole case. When ma-
terial inconsistency is discovered on appeal, this is the only course open to
the appellate court. Yet such retrial involves precisely the sort of delay and
expense that use of the special verdict was supposed to eliminate.
Impact of the use of special questions on the difficulty of achicving jury
unanimity. By multiplying the number of points at which formal agreement
must be reached, special verdict procedure increases the probability of hung
juries. Even in a simple negligence case, in which testing questions are not
used, the jury might have to reach formal agreement on negligence, con-
tributory negligence, proximate cause, assumption of risk and last clear
chance. Although the theory of the general verdict requires that the jury
reach unanimity on all issues in a case,61 in reality the jury is only compelled
to reach formal consensus once. "[] ury verdicts often represent compromises,
and it is not so easy to reach separate compromise agreements on several
fact findings of a special verdict as it is to agree on one all-inclusive general
verdict.' 62 Thus even if special verdict procedure were to add to the rationality
of the process, it would do so at the expense of increasing the danger of hung
juries - an obvious source of cost and delay. Similarly, the multiplication of
points for formal agreement, by adding to the length and arduousness of the
jury's task, may lead to precisely the kind of frustration and impatience that
use of the special verdict was designed to avoid.
Omnibus questions. The twin dangers of hung juries and of jury frustration
will lead to a considerable impetus to reduce the number of questions to be
put to the jury. In a case in which plaintiff alleges five items of negligence,
and defendant alleges five items of contributory negligence, should the judge
submit ten separate ultimate questions,3 or should he put only two omnibus
questions - one concerning negligence, the other contributory negligence?
If the trial judge lumps the ten questions into two, he must add instructions
which may confuse the jurors, serve as a source of error and appeal, and be
the cause of a new trial. The use of the omnibus question also increases the
61. See 6 MoopE, FEDEnmr PaRCricE f 59.08[4], at 3793-94 (1953).
62. Driver, The Special Verdict - Theory and Practice, 26 NVAsr. L Rxv. 21, 24
(1951).
63. Suppose there are a separate proximate cause issues in regard to the various ques-
tions. The imaginative reader can easily multiply for himself the number of possible ulti-
mate questions.
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possibility of jury compromise, and thus runs counter to the ideal which
leads to the desire for special verdicts. If a defendant is not guilty of negligence
on four of the items, but is on one, a jury might find the defendant not neg-
ligent, since he is four-fifths "innocent." Another danger is that three jurors
might agree on negligence on the first item, three on the second, three on the
third, and three on the fourth. The result may be a unanimous finding of
negligence in response to the omnibus question though there was not even a
majority on a single item. The judge may try to prevent this by instructing
that each item should be separately considered, but this increases the com-
plexity of the charge, and there remains the possibility that the jury will
ignore the instruction. The use of omnibus questions thus pushes the special
verdict into the realm of the general verdict by decreasing the alleged ra-
tionality of the procedure. On the other hand, if separate questions are given,
let alone if testing questions are used, efficiency is sacrificed for the sake of
alleged rationality. In this respect the two ends that the special verdict is sup-
posed to secure seem in irreconcilable conflict.
The special questions themselves as a source of delay and expense. The
special questions themselves may be the source of new problems. If the ques-
tions are misleading, incomplete, or prejudicially worded they may distort the
deliberations of the jury. Since the wording and form of the questions will
be significant, they will constitute a new source of appeal and retrial, and
substantial time and effort will have to be expended by the bar and bench in
drawing up the questions. In a system which required clear, careful, and specific
pleading Professor Sunderland's suggestion that the questions be taken from
the pleadings " would be worthy of consideration. But in our age of loose and
general pleadings, the suggestion is almost ludicrous.0
In summary, it would seem that the case for the special verdict was not
as strong as it was made to appear. Many of the promises of gain were
exaggerated, while most of the potential costs were overlooked. Further, the
commentators failed to acknowledge that the effects of the use of the special
verdict would depeiid on how it was administered. The controls placed on
counsel by the court, the form and nature of the questions put to the jury,
the methods of dealing with inconsistency, and the techniques of dealing with
trial error discovered on appeal would all influence the net effect that use of
special verdicts would have on the process of trial by jury. In retrospect it
would appear that the commentators both overstated and oversimplified in
presenting their case.
C. The General Verdict with Interrogatories
Enthusiasm for the special verdict not only led the commentators to over-
look the weaknesses in their case, it also caused them to dismiss lightly
64. Sunderland at 263.
65. Sunderlaid argues at 264, that this would have a good effect on the pleadings -
they would be framed with the jury in mind.
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the general verdict with interrogatories as a half-vray compromise of no
substantial value 66
The general verdict with interrogatories raises noessentially new problems;
rather it affects the weight to be given to the factors which were considered
in relation to the special verdict. Such shifting may be important, since it
may well determine the ultimate judgment of when and whether interroga-
tories are desirable. For example, to the extent that the general verdict with
interrogatories may achieve some of the virtues that the special verdict proce-
dure is designed to realize, consistent with retention of the jury's role of giving
effect to the sense of justice of the man in the street, it is a procedure worth
considering on its own merits.
On the one hand, interrogatories may serve a number of useful functions.
The conscientious jury may be helped by the focus which the interrogatories
give to the evidence. Similarly, special questions used together with a general
verdict may have the same psychological impact that those used with special
verdicts are said to have. The interrogatories are also a means of testing
the general verdict, and thus of exercising some control over result-oriented
juries. On the other hand, many of the problems associated with the special
verdict may arise. The general charge will give a result-oriented jury suffi-
cient information to make its answers consistent with its general verdict. The
problems of confusion and delay arising from the general instruction wlU
not be diminished. The courts will have to determine in each case whether
the answers are materially inconsistent with the general verdict, and what
course should be followed if such inconsistency exists; the judge may some-
times be able to vacate the general verdict and enter judgment on the answers
but often the answers will not be sufficient to support a judgment and the
only remedy in that case is a complete new trial. The use of separate ques-
tions will multiply the occasions for formal agreement and may, therefore,
lead to jury frustration and impatience, and increase the possibility of a hung
jury. Finally, the questions will require careful drafting, and may themselves
serve as a new source of appellate litigation and retrials.07
IV. RUr.E 49
A. Analysis of the Rule
Having examined the historical development of the special verdict and the
general verdict with interrogatories, and having analyzed the case for the
special verdict put forth by the commentators in the years immediately pre-
ceding the adoption of Rule 49, we will now turn to read the rule itself against
this background. There are two basic perspectives from which to analyze
the rule: (1) how does it attempt to cope with the formalisms and technicali-
ties which made the common law procedures full of pitfalls for the litigant?
66. See note 42 supra.
67. In addition to the difficulties raised in the text, use of interrogatories might -
by highlighting the "irrationality" of the general verdict - serve to undermine popular
confidence in the process of trial by jury. See note 56'stpra.
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and (2) how does it respond to the difficulties inherent in the commentators'
case?
Waiver. The main thrust of section (a) "Special Verdicts," is directed
toward the elimination of the major hazard which had made the use of the
common law special verdict dangerous: the requirement that the jury, often
without help or directions from the court, return a finding on every essential
element of the cause of action whether or not at issue in the case. Many
courts had deemed a failure to return a finding equivalent to a finding against
the party having the burden of proof on that issue.08 Rule 49(a) seeks to
eliminate this hazard by making use of the doctrine of waiver. The opening
sentence of section (a) indicates that when a special verdict is used the court
should request the jury to return a finding on "each issue of the fact." But
the rule goes on to provide that the omission of a finding on "any issue of
fact" is not necessarily fatal to a judgment entered on a special verdict. Un-
less a party objected to the omission of an issue from the questions submitted,
he is deemed to have waived jury trial on that issue. If an issue was omitted
without objection, the trial judge is authorized to make the necessary factual
finding explicitly; and if the trial court fails to make such a finding an appellate
court is to assume that the required finding was made in accordance with
the judgment rendered by the trial court.
Evidentiary or ultimate questions? The only indication given by Rule 49(a)
concerning the nature of the questions to be put to the jury is that they be
directed to "issue[s] of fact." Although the rule is not explicit as to whether
it contemplates juries making formal findings on every issue raised by the
evidence, or only on all the issues of ultimate fact, it must be construed to
require only the latter. The third sentence of section (a) indicates that a
trial judge will have to give some legal instructions to the jury when a special
verdict is employed.69 This can be read as a recognition that jurors will be
charged with deciding issues of ultimate fact by applying legal definitions
formulated by the court to their conclusions drawn from the evidence. More-
over, since the common-law tradition of the special verdict required that
the jury answer all questions of ultimate fact;70 since the advocates of the
special verdict had never argued that the jury should not continue to perform
the function of applying legal definitions to the evidence; since any other
construction would render the provision for waiver mere surplusage ;71 and
68. See Green at 715-16; Ilsen & Hone at 7; Note, 34 ILL. L. Rlv. 96, 98-99 (1939).
69. "The Court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the
matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue." This sentence seems to contemplate more than general instructions on burdens
of proof, etc.
70. Note, 34 ILL. L. Rzv. 96, 98 (1939).
71. The provision for waiver must be read to contemplate waiver of ultimate fact
questions. See note 73 infra and accompanying text. If explicit provision for waiving ulti-
mate questions is made, it must be because, in the absence of waiver, one would have a
right to such questions; that is, if one had no right there would be no need for a provision
that one could be held to have waived it.
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since very serious constitutional questions should be raised if Rule 49 were
thought to deprive a party of the right to a jury determination of questions
of ultimate fact ;72 it seems safe to assume - in the absence of any indication
to the contrary in the rule - that this right was meant to be preserved. Most
convincing, however, is the fact that it would be impossible to read the rule
as granting a right to have every issue of evidentiary fact submitted. Such
a right would enable a party to render the special verdict procedure com-
pletely unworkable.73 Thus, it is ultimate, not evidentiary, facts which a party
is entitled to have put to the jury. The question remains whether Rule 49
permits a trial judge to use testing questions, either going to issues of evi-
dentiary fact or to the jury's understanding of the legal definitions given by
the judge. There is nothing in the cryptic phrase "issue of fact" which denies
to the trial judge the discretion to submit such questions, whether on his
own motion or on that of one of the parties. Assuming that section (a) leaves
such discretion in the trial judge, problems associated with inconsistent answers
will arise; unlike section (b), dealing with general verdicts with interroga-
tories, section(a) gives no guidance as to how such problems should be met.74
72. Although the Court, in Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.RR, 165 U.S. 593, 596
(1897), said that the seventh amendment guarantees jury trial only on issues of fact, it
probably meant issues of ultimate fact.
73. Even the simplest case involves a virtually unlimited number of "evidentiary" fact
issues. What look like simple fact questions can easily be broken down into components.
For example, the question whether defendant ran a red light could be reduced to a series
of questions such as: was the light red? did the car go against it? was defendant driving?
In turn, these questions could be subdivided: was there a light? was it red?
74. If testing questions may properly be used within the context of the special verdict
procedure the problems of dealing with inconsistency will necessarily arise, since the very
purpose of such questions is the discovery of inconsistency. One might argue from the pro-
vision for dealing with inconsistency in section (b) and the absence of any similar pro-
vision in section (a) that testing questions were not to be used with the special verdict
procedure. This is probably a too sophisticated reading of the rule; it would seem more
likely that the drafters never specifically considered the problems and possibilities of using
testing questions with special verdicts. When testing questions are used and the answers
are, at least on their face, inconsistent, the court must then determine whether or not to
try to harmonize the answers and thereby save the verdict, or either to dismiss the jurors
or to re-submit the questions. When inconsistencies arise in a general verdict with inter-
rogatories, the courts have been directed to attempt to harmonize the interrogatories with
the general verdict. See cases cited in note 135 infra. When a special verdict is used, the
situation is somewhat different. Superficially, all of the answers are of the same weight,
and therefore it can be argued that it is impossible to attempt to harmonize inconsistent
answers as the process of reconciliation must involve answers of different relative weights.
If both A and B are accorded the same weight, the court will not know whether to at-
tempt to read A to conform to B, or B to conform to A. See the dissent of Justice Stewart
in Gallick v. Baltimore & OR.IL, 372 U.S. 108, 124-27 (1963). But there is no need to
view all special questions as equals. Testing questions may be viewed as the equivalent of
the interrogatories used with a general verdict with interrogatories, and the questions
directed at ultimate fact as the equivalent of the general verdict itself when 49(b) is
employed. This being so, the court may then attempt to make the answers to the testing
questions conform to the answers to the ultimate fact questions. See "General verdicts Uitll
interrogatories: the problem of inconsistency," at notes 79-81 infra.
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Furthermore, it is surprising in light of Rule 49(a)'s implicit guarantee of
the right to have each issue of ultimate fact submitted to the jury, that no
provision is made for the eventuality that the jury fails to answer one of
the questions submitted.
Form of the questions. Another major hazard encountered with the common-
law special verdict arose from the apparent practice on the part of judges
of submitting only a general request for factual findings, rather than a set
of specific questions. Since the jurors were expected to return answers on
all necessary issues of ultimate fact, and since untrained jurors were often
unable to distinguish between matters of evidentiary fact, matters of ultimate
fact, and matters of law, the practice of leaving these difficult matters to the
jury "cramped the life out of the special verdict."' 5 Although Rule 49(a)
does not explicitly proscribe this practice, it does seem to contemplate that
questions in some form would be put to the jury - at least if a party specifi-
cally requested them. The rule provides that questions "susceptible of cate-
gorical or other brief answer," or multiple-choice questions, may be used by
the trial court to elicit the necessary information. If all the jurors need do
is answer "yes" or "no" or tick off an answer from a multiple-choice selection,
their failure to grasp the difference between an ultimate fact, an evidentiary
fact, and a legal conclusion will not be harmful. In such cases the form of
the answers is the responsibility of the lawyers and the judge. But the rule
does not make these two modes of inquiry exclusive. Section (a) goes on
to authorize the trial judge to use "such other method of submitting the issues"
as he deems appropriate to obtain the necessary written findings. This grant
of broad discretion regarding the form and type of question to be used was
the result of yet another attempt to avoid a pitfall associated with the use
of the common-law special verdict. In some states the form which questions
were required to take had become so rigid that lawsuits were often determined
on procedural niceties.7 The rule seeks to avoid rigid requirements concern-
ing the form of questions, but does so at the expense of failing to give guides
with respect to the problems of inadequate, confusing, and prejudicial ques-
tions. The rule does not indicate whether the questions are to be drawn from
the pleadings, nor by whom they are to be framed - the discretion of the
trial judge seems to be unfettered in both respects; nor does -the rule indicate
when in the trial process the questions are to be framed, apparently leaving to
the trial judge's discretion such matters as whether they are to be decided
upon at the outset and the trial organized around them, and whether counsel
are to be informed of their content before final argument and allowed to use
them in summation. The rule is also silent on the question whether instructions
on legal definitions may or should be given in writing and appended to the
relevant questions. Finally, section (a) fails to give any indication whether
omnibus questions may be used.
75. Green at 716.
76. Id. at 717-18.
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Preserving the jury's integrity. Since the special verdict was conceived,
in part, as a device to enforce the law-fact dichotomy of function between
judge and jury, it is notable that Rule 49(a) does not deal with the question
whether the trial judge is to attempt to control the jury's knowledge of the
effect its answers will have on the outcome of the case and, if so, to what
lengths he is authorized to go.'7 It seems to leave to his discretion whether he
will instruct the jury on the rules of law that will be applied to its findings or
indicate which party a given answer would favor. There is no basis in the
rule for a broad discretion in the trial judge to regulate the forensic conduct
of counsel in order to preserve the jury's ignorance of the relationship between
its answers and the result in the case.
Appellate review. Rule 49 does not attempt to deal with any of the questions
arising from appellate review of judgments entered on a special verdict. Rule
59, New Trials: Amendment of Judgments, states that new trials "may be
granted... on all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been
a trial by jury" and thereby seems to authorize the use of the partial retrial
of a single question of fact in the context of the special verdict. No indication
is given by Rule 49 as to whether and when an appellate court, reversing a
single special finding as improperly submitted to the jury, should remand
for a new trial rather than enter judgment directly on the basis of the other
findings.78
General verdicts with interrogatories- the problem of inconsistency. Section
(b), authorizing the use of the general verdict with interrogatories, raises
most of the problems discussed in connection with section (a). However,
section (b) is unique in making explicit provision for the problem of incon-
sistency. No indication is given as to the extent to which the trial judge should
attempt to harmonize answers 79 which are only prima facie inconsistent with
each other or with the general verdict - that is, when an inconsistency is to
be deemed "material." But the rule authorizes the following procedures in
the case of material inconsistency: when the jury's answers are consistent
with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may enter
77. A case in which the trial judge went about as far as he could go in the other
direction is Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959). The jury brought in a
general verdict for plaintiff but left blank a sheet of interrogatories, not thinking it ,;as
necessary that the questions be answered. After some confusion, the judge sent the jury
back to answer the questions. 'I did tell them this, however: 'Of course you ansver 2 and
3 "No" then there can be no verdict for the plaintiff, you understand?' The jury said they
did." 168 F. Supp. at 160. In affirming the jury's verdict for plaintiff, the court of appeals
did not consider this point.
78. Both of these problems arising out of appellate review raise the problem of the
possible interrelationship of the jury's answers. See "Inspact of the use of special verdicts
on the problem of expense and delay," at note 50 supra.
79. The rule does use the word 'armonious" at one point, in describing answers on
which judgment may be entered, thereby indicating that surface inconsistency may not
preclude judgment.
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judgment on the answers, or return the jury for further consideration of its
answers and general verdict, or order a new trial; when the jury's answers
are inconsistent with each other and one or more is inconsistent with the
general verdict, the court may return the jury or order a new trial.80 The
rule does not attempt to give any guide as to which of the authorized pro-
cedures is preferable, nor does it indicate the considerations which should
influence the trial judge's choice.81 Since testing questions used with a special
verdict perform the same function as interrogatories with a general verdict,
the procedures of section (b) for dealing with interrogatories inconsistent
with the general verdict would presumably also hold for a testing question
inconsistent with the ultimate fact question it is designed to test.
When the new procedures should be used. The preceding analysis of Rule
49' discloses that in almost every particular of implementation a virtually
unfettered discretion is left in the trial judge. Indeed, with respect to many
of the problems it poses, the rule does not even recognize the occasions which
will call for the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. But even more re-
markable than the rule's lack of guides and standards on questions of how
to use the new procedures is the complete lack of any hints on the question
when they should be used.82
B. The Intent of the Drafters
It would seem that the almost complete lack of standards which character-
izes Rule 49 can be explained by the confluence of two intentions held by
the drafters of the rule. Flexibility is a theme which pervades the Federal
Rules ;8 in the case of special verdicts, the technical pitfalls which had ham-
strung the special verdict at common law emphasized the need for a flexible
rule. Second, the drafters seem to have intended to do no more than authorize
the new procedures, leaving the details of their implementation - in par-
ticular the development of standards - to grow out of practical experience.
The drafters probably recognized that the commentators had built their case
largely on unproven assumptions and that many of the procedural difficulties
which would arise from use of the new procedures had never been adequately
considered; they must have felt that far more knowledge was needed both
80. The rule does not deal with the possibility that the answers are inconsistent with
each other, but all are consistent with the general verdict.
81. See "Use of testing questions," at notes 59-60 supra, for discussion of the problems
inherent in returning the jury for further consideration.
82. The structure of Rule 49, with its omission of any reference to the general ver-
dict, seems to imply that the new procedures are exceptions which may be used, but that
the standard practice of general verdicts is to remain the normal procedure.
83. One of those primarily responsible for the drafting of the Federal Rules observed:
[P]rocedural rules are but means to an end, means to the enforcement of substantive
justice, and therefore there should be no finality in procedural rules themselves
except as they attain that objective.




of the problems that would be posed by the new procedures and of the impact
that special verdicts and general verdicts with interrogatories, and the various
ways they might be used, would have on the process of trial by jury. Until
experience had provided such knowledge, the drafters must have been un-
willing to commit the federal courts to a set of concrete practices. The failure
of Rule 49 to provide any standards to guide the exercise of discretion can
thus be read as implicitly authorizing trial court experimentation with the
three procedures on the theory that the craftsmen who use a tool can best
appreciate its nature and gain the information and insight necessary for its
rational utilization. As such knowledge began to accumulate, it was probably
hoped that the appellate courts would gradually be able to develop broad
standards to limit the unfettered discretion initially given out of necessity
to the trial courts.
Nor would the development of such standards be inconsistent with the
basic philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - the attainment
and preservation of flexibility in the administration of procedural rules. The
drafters certainly did not envisage an elimination of all discretion from Rule
49 practice through the creation of rigid rules and the review of all trial court
decisions. Rather the likely concern of the drafters was two-fold: that the
appellate courts establish the range of discretion under Rule 49 by distin-
guishing between decisions that should be left to trial court discretion and
those that should be subject to review, and that they place substantive limits
on the exercise of discretion by distinguishing between permissible and im-
permissible reasons for reaching decisions within trial court discretion. For
example, one would suppose that a trial court's discretion in deciding whether
to use testing questions would be limited in that in some cases a use of such
questions would be abusive, either because outside the range of permissible
discretion (e.g., putting a vast number of testing questions to the jury) s or
because some kinds of reasons for using testing questions would be patently
unacceptable (e.g., a desire to discourage special verdict procedure by putting
as many questions to the jury as possible).8r
84. See, for an attempt to deal with the problem of the range of discretion, Phillips
Chem. Co. v. Hulbert, 301 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1962). There, the jury returned a general
verdict for plaintiff, but did not consider in doing so an interrogatory on the crucial issue
of malice, because, by an oversight, the interrogatory had not been sent with them. Sent
back to consider the interrogatory, the jury found no malice, a finding inconsistent vAth its
general verdict. The judge sent the jury back to reconsider both its general verdict and
its answer to the interrogatory and the jury changed the latter. The court of appeals re-
versed. Judge Tuttle, writing for the court, said:
[I]t was improper to return the jury for further consideration because the jury
had been rendered incapable of fairly resolving the inconsistency due to the fact that
it had reached its general verdict without any consideration whatever of the special
interrogatory on malice.
Id. at 751.
85. See United States v .Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 1959), on appeal after
remand, 278 F_2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960), for an example (in a different context - i.e.,
sentencing discretion) of an "abuse" of discretion by use of an illegitimate reason.
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An alternative hypothesis is of course conceivable. The drafters of Rule 49
may have intended that trial court discretion under it be absolute: unguided
substantively and unlimited in the range over which it might operate. Merely
to state this alternative is to refute it as a serious possibility. Under this view
all trial court decisions under Rule 49 would be unreviewable no matter how
arbitrary the reason or how undesirable the result. This theory would ignore
both the general principle that there may always be an abuse of discretion
and the heretofore unquestioned assumption of appellate courts that they
might properly review at least some decisions under Rule 49. Such absolute
discretion is not to be found in the other Federal Rules.80 One would expect
it least of all in Rule 49 where the issues at stake - the conduct, nature and
scope of jury trial - are more important than in most of the other rules.
Finally, Rule 49, except for the word "may," does not speak in terms of dis-
cretion. If absolute discretion is to be found in the rule, it must be found in
the fact that most of the problems of special verdict and interrogatory proce-
dure are not dealt with at all. Rather than attribute these numerous hiatuses
to an intention to provide for absolute discretion, it seems far more plausible
- for all the reasons given above - to attribute them to a simple incapacity
to formulate the appropriate "good reasons" and limitations of range which
should govern discretion in the use of the new procedures.
If absolute discretion is abandoned as an untenable hypothesis of the drafters'
expectations, as it seems it must be, determination of the proper range of dis-
cretion, and of the amount of guidance appellate courts should give for its
exercise, depends upon resolution of the question why, in a particular situa-
tion, a discretionary decision - one that is unreviewable except for "abuse" -
is desirable. In the context of the Federal Rules, flexibility is the guiding
principle. The flexibility of the Rules lies in their vast expansion of the range
of discretionary decisions, based upon a desire to enable trial courts to take
individual circumstances into account and to apply expertise and intuition
to the resolution of problems arising during the course of litigation. Clearly
this flexibility could not have been achieved had parties been entitled to par-
ticular decisions - that is, entitled to demand a statement of the reasons for
86. Most of the Rules addressed to trial courts are, although flexible, quite specific,
Those which refer explicitly to "discretion" include specification of a number of factors
relevant to its exercise ("good reasons") (e.g., Rules 16 and 24; cf. Rules 37(c) ad 60).
Others provide that the judge may do something (e.g., enlarge the time for a party to ful-
fill a requirement) "for cause shown" (e.g., Rules 6(b), 30, 31(d), 33, 35(a)). Others
refer to decisions "on such terms as are just" (e.g., Rules 34, 12(e)) or "as justice may
require" (e.g., Rule 33; cf. Rules 12, 15(a), 16, 30). Finally, a number of the rules limit
and qualify the extent of the discretion they grant (e.g., Rules 15, 17, 19, 20, 43, 53). Two
themes may be derived from these other rules: first, the concept of discretion they reflect
is one in which a decision must be based upon good reasons, and in which the rules
themselves frequently indicate, implicitly or by the principle of ehusdem generis, the limi-
tations upon the kind of reasons which are to be considered "good"; and second, that the
range of "discretion" should be limited to circumstances in which sound judicial admnils-
tration demands that the parties not be entitled to appellate review of a particular decision.
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every decision, and to challenge all decisions on appeal8 7 Only abusive de-
cisions - those patently based upon no "good reason" or outside the proper
range of discretion - could be appealable, if the new flexibility was not to
be inconsistent with the administration of justice. It is in the light of this
underlying policy in favor of flexibility that questions concerning appellate
guidance of trial court discretion under Rule 49 must be resolved. Flexibility
may be inappropriate with respect to some decisions, or it may not require
discretion; in other circumstances, the need for flexibility may preclude the
appellate courts from proscribing any but the most patently "bad" reasons
(e.g., desire to favor a party). But with respect to most decisions, the ap-
propriate discretion will probably be one whose range is clearly defined, and
which is guided by more or less specific standards for deciding what reasons
are good.
V. JUDICIAL EXEGESIS oF RuLE 49
The case law of the past twenty-five years has added some flesh to the
skeletal provisions of Rule 49, but, on the whole, very few guides or stand-
87. The relationships between the concepts of "discretion," "entitlement" "abuse," "good
reasons," and their respective roles in the judicial process are complex. A court's decision,
properly rendered, is never "free" in the sense that it is based upon whim or the personal
preferences of the judge. A judge is expected to decide the issues before him on the basis
of reasons which are acceptable in the legal system of which he is a part; he must ap-
proach every decision with the intention of reaching the right result, though in many cases
this result will not be dictated by the syllogistic application of a rule, but will have to be
determined after the consideration, weighing and comparison of a number of policies prin-
ciples and standards, some of which may conflict. A "discretionary" decision in the legal
context is not one in which the judge is absolved from this general duty, but rather is one
in which - for reasons of expediency, economy, or other considerations - a judge is not
expected to articulate his reasons. We express this by saying that no party is entitled to
any particular decision, meaning not that the judge need not have reasons (this would be
an "abuse" of discretion) but only that he is not called upon to give them- to justify his
decision. Only if a party can affirmatively show that it was based upon no application of
legitimate reasons - that it was arbitrary and "abusive" of the trust implicit in the grant
of discretion - can he attack such a discretionary decision.
The concept of discretion implicit in the hypothesis that Rule 49 was drafted to leave
"unfettered discretion" in the hands of trial judges is quite different; it is, in effect, a
concept of free choice. The hypothesis is that the drafters thought trial judges can and
should exercise such "discretion," subject neither to generally accepted good "reasons" nor
to reversal for "abuse" (How can one abuse a choice?) except for gross impropriety.
There seems to be no area of the law in which judges are, in theory, given such freedom
to choose. The objections to allowing judges such freedom are overwhelming. They range
from the problems of forum-shopping, unpredictability of decisions, and inequality before
the law, through the various values associated with the rule of law, to the most important
consideration of all: in a democratic society, it would be anomalous to allow a non-repre-
sentative branch of government freedom to prescribe nzew law - law not derivable from
established principles and policies. We establish a judicial branch and give judges enor-
mous power not because we want to be bound by the personal preferences of the judiciary
(let alone in individual cases), but because we need the judicial function - the application
of existing law to particular cases. The hypothesis would thus assume that the drafters
held an untenable conception of the role of a judge. See, for a general discussion of judicial
"discretion," Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. Pm.os. 624 (1963).
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ards have developed. From the beginning, the courts distinguished between
issues of evidentiary fact and issues of ultimate fact, holding that Rule 49
guarantees only the right to have questions directed to the latter.88 The courts
have also enforced the waiver doctrine strictly, leaving it to the parties to
protect their right to have all questions of ultimate fact submitted to the
jury. 9 But if a party's timely demand for submission of such an issue is
denied, the mere fact that the trial judge makes an explicit finding on the
issue will not cure the error.00 The judge can, of course, submit questions
to the jury on his own motion.91
One might have anticipated considerable problems of distinguishing be-
tween questions of ultimate fact on the one hand, and questions of law and
questions of evidentiary fact on the other. From an analytic perspective,
"ultimate fact" seems merely a deceptively simple name for what is no more
than the zone of transition between questions of evidentiary fact and ques-
tions of law. Negligence, for example, may be seen as a question of ultimate
fact when considered as an element in a legal rule (in order to be liable, de-
fendant's negligence must have been the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury) ;
it may also be seen as a question of law when considered as a composite of
88. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Broadway, 110 F2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1940);
Truitt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 67, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 784,
789 (5th Cir. 1960) ; A.M. Webb & Co. v. Robert P. Miller Co., 78 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D.
Pa. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 176 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949).
89. Ribeiro v. United Fruit Co., 284 F2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 872 (1961); L'Urbaine et la Seine v. Rodriguez, 268 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1959) ;
Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1956); Union Pac. R.R.
v. Bridal Veil Lumber Co., 219 F2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. detied, 350 U.S. 981
(1956). The courts have required more than a demand for the submission of an Isste: a
timely objection to the denial of a demand must also be made. See 2b BAiuoN & HOLT-
ZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1053, at 334 (Rules ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as BARo N & HOLTZOFF]. This is an exception to the general rule of federal trial prac-
tice that once a party has made his position known to the court it is not necessary that
he repeat it or take formal exception when the court takes contrary action. See FD., RI,
Cirv. P. 46; 2b BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1021, at 309-12. One commentator suggests that this
"harsh" requirement gives the trial judge an opportunity to correct any inadvertent failure
to submit an issue. 2b BARnoN & HoLTzorr § 1053, at 334. But although the rule may
limit the number of new trials caused by the failure of the judge to submit an issue de-
manded, one wonders if the price paid by the litigants is not too high. Inexperienecd
counsel, not aware that there lurks an exception to the general practice, may waive their
clients' right to jury trial on an issue without even realizing that they have sacrificed the
fundamental right. Since spedial verdicts are rarely used, many counsel must be unfamiliar
with the special requirement. The rule would seem to create a real trap for the unwary or
unskilled, and it is certainly doubtful whether the benefit of a double warning to the trial
judge is worth such a price.
See Palmiero v. Spada Distrib. Co., 217 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1954), a case in which the
court relaxed the general rule when the trial judge had led counsel to believe that inter-
rogatories on all facts would be submitted.
90. See Palmiero v. Spada Distrib. Co., 217 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1954).
91. 2b BARRON & HoLvzorr § 1054, at 336-41. Query whether the judge would sub-
mit a question over the objection of both parties.
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more limited factual elements (negligence is conduct causing a foreseeable
danger the risk of which outweighs the cost of avoidance); finally, it may
be seen as a question of evidentiary fact when considered as a category with
which we organize experience 92 ("Was the defendant negligent or wasn't
he?" when asked in the same sense as 'Did the defendant have red hair?").
But notwithstanding these apparent theoretical difficulties, there is no indi-
cation that courts have experienced great practical difficulty in making the
distinctions.9 3 Because the problem is not unique to the special verdict con-
text, the courts have been able to draw on centuries of experience in charac-
terizing questions as "law" or "fact!'"
Although testing questions have apparently been used,05 no judgment has
been vacated because of their submission to the jury in addition to questions
of ultimate fact. Therefore, no court has addressed itself to the problem of
the use of testing questions: the case law has failed to limit the range of
trial court discretion - e.g., whether a court must await a party's motion
before using testing questions - and has given no guides for the exercise
of this discretion within its proper range.90
While the use of testing questions is not discussed in the cases, the prob-
lem of inconsistency - a product of the use of testing questions 'IT - has
been dealt with expressly.98 Jury findings which are materially inconsistent
will not support a judgment.09 When a jury returns what appear to be con-
flicting findings, the trial court must attempt to harmonize them if it is
possible to do so on a "fair and reasonable" reading'0 0 The opinions do not
92. See Lawis, Mw Am rE WorLD OmaR (1929).
93. But cf. Lipscomb at 194-99.
94. Courts operating within the context of the traditional general verdict have always
had to draw the distinction between fact and law for the purposes of instructions, directed
verdicts, and appeals.
95. See notes 98-102 infra.
96. But see Truitt v. Travelers Ins. Co, 175 F. Supp. 67, 72 (S.D. Te.'x. 1959), aff'd,
280 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1960) : "only ultimate questions of fact raised by the pleadings and
evidence, which are important to the judgment, may be submitted to the jury for deter-
mination by special verdict."
97. It must be noted that inconsistency in the answers to the special interrogatories
may not necessarily indicate that testing questions were consciously used. Sloppily drafted
ultimate fact questions might overlap, and hence leave room for inconsistency, or a court,
confused by the ultimate-evidentiary distinction, might arrive at a set of testing questions
by accident.
98. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dial, 311 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963); R.B. Co. v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1962); McVey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 288 F2d 53
(5th Cir. 1961); Missouri Pac. R-R v. Salazar, 254 F2d 847 (5th Cir. 1958); Rorem
v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 246 F2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Neff v. Western
Co-op. Hatcheries, 241 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1957). See Mounger v. Vells 30 F2d 521
(5th Cir. 1929), for a pre-Rule 49 treatment of the problem.
99. See R.B. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., mipra note 98.
100. Id. at 759-60; McVey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 288 F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir. 1961);
Cellanese Corp. v. John Clark Indus, Inc., 214 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1954) ; cf. Gallick
v. Baltimore & O.RLR. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963).
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go beyond this in articulating a test for determining when the inconsistency
is such that no judgment can be entered. If a conflict cannot be reconciled,
the trial judge may either dismiss the jury and set the case for retrial 101 or
resubmit the questions to the jury.10 2 The case law provides no guides for
distinguishing the situations in which one or the other of the alternatives
is preferable, and no indication of what type of instruction the court should
give the jury when the latter alternative is chosen.
Similarly, the case law generally has left the discretion of the trial judge
with respect to the form and nature of questions unguided. 10 3 Although there
are hortatory statements in appellate opinions that a question should be clear,
concise, non-prejudicial, and directed toward a single issue of fact, there
are very few cases which hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in
relation to the form or nature of the questions he submitted.10 4 Most of the
opinions which do find an abuse are based on the submission of a question
going to an issue on which the appellate court concludes reasonable men
could not differ.'0 5 There is no requirement that the questions should relate
to, or come out of, the pleadings, nor any indication of when or by whom
the questions should be drawn. When a court submits a question directed
to an ultimate fact, it must provide an instruction which explains the legal
definition the jury is to apply.'00 The cases do not indicate whether such
definitions should be appended directly to questions or whether the court
may combine them into a general instruction. Nor are there opinions which
discuss the form instructions should take. While the courts early recognized
that the omnibus question would be a useful and sometimes necessary device, 07
101. Cf. Mounger v. Wells, 30 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1929), a pre-Rule 49 case.
102. See Truitt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Tex. 1959), aff'd, 280
F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dial, 311 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963).
103. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Horab, 309 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1962); Mickey v.
Tremco Mfg. Co., 226 F.2d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Thorp v. Am. Aviation & Gen. Ins.
Co., 212 F.2d 821, 830 (3d Cir. 1954); De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d
409, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1954); Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588, 593 (7th
Cir. 1953) ; Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Davis Frozen Foods, Inc., 195 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953). But cf. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Third Natl Bank, 173 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949).
104. Although the form of the question may be so misleading as to constitute revers-
ible error, the appellate courts will not treat such matter as grounds for appeal unless
counsel took objection to the form of the question at trial. Filipek v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 258 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Huse v. Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc., 227 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1955).
105. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Springer, 269 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. dcnlid, 361
U.S. 932 (1960). There is not even a clear rule that the existence of a material fact In
issue must not be assumed in a question, though some commentators feel that such a rule
would be desirable. See Lipsconb at 200. No one seems to know whether such questions
have been used by trial courts.
106. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Horab, 309 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1962); McDonnell v, Tim-
merman, 289 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1959); Jackson v. King, 223 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955);
Feldmann v. Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1944).
107. Concord Co. v. Willcuts, 125 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denicd, 316 U.S.
705 (1942); Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939). In
[Vol. 74:- 483
SPECIAL VERDICTS
no standards have developed as to when and with respect to what kinds of
allegations omnibus treatment is appropriate.108
The courts have not given a firm answer to the question of what results
should follow the failure of a jury to answer a question. Although there is
almost no case law on the problem, there is some indication that the judge
may request the jury to reconsider the question.1 9 But no guides have emerged
as to when this course should be resorted to in lieu of ordering a new trial,
nor how the judge should instruct the jury on directing it to reconsider; and
the courts which have suggested that new trial is a proper course 110 have
not indicated whether and when a partial retrial is appropriate. Other cases
have suggested that a failure to answer may be taken as an answer against
the party having the burden of proof.' Such a practice is questionable, based
as it is on a fiction that is patently contrary to fact. A hung jury when a
general verdict is used results in a new trial, not a directed verdict against
the party with the burden of proof; there is no apparent reason why the
practice under the special verdict should vary.
The courts have dealt extensively with the problem of what instructions
and information the trial judge should give, or allow to be given, to the jury
concerning the effects that particular answers will have on the outcome of
the litigation. Although in some states there are rulings that the judge is in
error if he frames the questions so as to suggest to the jurors the legal effect
of their answersm' there is no rigid rule in the federal courts on this point 113
or on the related issue of whether a general charge should be given. Informing
Roach the question "(1) Do you or not find as a matter of fact that the Insurance Com-
pany'waived the breach of the policy?" (id. at 852) was used. This was criticized in
Lipscomb at 198-99 as too broad. The case involved an attempted disclaimer of liability
by an insurance company on a policy in the procuring of which some false information
had been given. There had been a breach as a matter of law, but the company might have
been found to have waived the breach at any of a number of times. The judge found it
necessary to accompany the question with an oral explanation of the law of waiver.
108. The factors involved include: the relation between questions to be grouped (ixc.,
whether they merely reflect different aspects of a single transaction, or are unrelated),
the number of issues in a trial, the independent importance of the questions, etc.
109. Union Pac. LR. v. Bridal Veil Lumber Co., 219 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956).
110. Id. at 831-32.
111. Gelfand v. Strohecker, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 655, 663 (N.D. Ohio 1956), aff'd Per
curiam, 243 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957).
112. See, e.g, McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 515-18, 518-19,
93 N.W.2d 552, 562-64, 564-65 (1958) ; Anderson v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 233, 271 N.V.
844, 845 (1937) ("This court has frequently held that it is error for the court to inform
the jury of the effect of their answer to a question upon the rights of the parties, and
have not infrequently held that so to inform the jury was reversible error."); Bench v.
Gehl, 204 Wis. 367, 371, 235 N.W. 778, 780 (1931).
113. L'Urbaine et la Seine v. Rodriguez, 268 F2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1959); Ward v.
Cochran, 71 Fed. 127, 134 (8th Cir. 1895) (held to be error but harmless error). But see
Cate v. Good Bros., 181 F2d 146, 149 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 826 (1950);
Thedorf v. Lipsey, 237 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1956).
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the jury, either directly or indirectly, as to whom an answer will favor violates
the theory of the special verdict, but the deviation from the theory may be
considered valuable if it keeps jurors from indulging in guesswork. This
justification assumes that jurors operating in the context of the special verdict
will not always limit themselves to fact finding, an assumption that courts
are not anxious to articulate. Thus opinions holding that it is not error for
the judge to give a general charge or to indicate the effects of the answers
in his instructions tend to give no reason beyond stating that because the
trial judge has untrammeled discretion in choosing between the general
verdict, special verdict, and general verdict with interrogatories, there is no
good reason why he should not be allowed to devise any intermediate type
of process which has some of the characteristics of all three.114 However, it
is clear that the parties have no right that the judge inform the jury, either
directly or indirectly, as to the effects of its answers. Finally, no rules have
emerged concerning the power of the trial judge to prevent counsel from
informing the jury.11
No requirement has developed that the trial judge state explicitly what
rule of law he has applied to the jury's findings in rendering judgment. Rule
49, moreover, indicates that it is not mandatory for the trial judge to make
explicit findings of fact on all material issues not submitted to the jury.110
The combination of an unstated rule of law and an unstated finding of fact
may render appellate review of some elements of a judgment impossible. Sup-
pose, for example, a negligence action where the defendant fails to request a
question on assumption of risk although there is some evidence to support
such a question; the jury answers the questions submitted favorably to the
plaintiff; and the trial court renders judgment for the plaintiff, believing that
the defense of assumption of risk does not lie in the kind of action involved.
No review could be had of the trial court's implicit holding on this latter point,
since even if the appellate court believed that assumption of risk was a defense
in the action, it would have to assume that a factual finding against the de-
fendant on that point had been made by the trial court. In truth, however,
the trial court would have made no factual finding on the issue at all. When
a party fails to object to the omission of a question he may waive jury trial
114. See L'Urbaine et la Seine v. Rodriquez, supra note 113, at 5. See also Note, 43
MixN. L. Rxv. 823 (1959).
115. Minnesota, which limits the power of the court to inform the jury, hag held that
it is error for counsel expressly or impliedly to inform the jurors of the effects of their
answers. Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 508-09, 105 N.W2d 244, 248 (1960) (held
not prejudicial in this case). See also 2b BAnnox & HOLTZOFF § 1056.1 & n.52.9, at 349.
But the Fifth Circuit has suggested that the parties have a right to timely notice that the
judge intends to submit the case to the jury with a special verdict, so that counsel may,
among other things, "plan an effective argument whose objective is to translate persuasion
into specific decisive action by the jury." Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 152,
157 (5th Cir. 1959).
116. "As to an issue omitted without such demand [by a party] the court may make
a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on the special verdict." FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
[Vol, 74: 483
SPECIAL VERDICTS
on the issue, but he certainly should not be held to have waived his right to
have the issue tried. This problem could be dealt with in any of three ways:
(1) Rule 49 could be amended to require the judge to make his factual find-
ings explicit; (2) appellate courts could require trial judges to make explicit
the rule of law they apply; (3) appellate courts could scrutinize with par-
ticular care the evidentiary basis for implicit factual findings by trial judges.
The third alternative is clearly only a partial corrective. There seems no rea-
son why both the first and second alternatives should not be followed in order
to facilitate review of special verdict cases. When the whole case is tried to a
judge, Rule 52 requires him to make explicit findings on all issues of mate-
rial fact." 7 No good reason appears for a different practice under Rule 49.
In the absence of such an amendment to Rule 49, however, appellate courts
should at least require trial courts to make explicit what law they have applied.
Other vexing problems arising out of appellate review of special verdict
cases are whether and under what circumstances a partial retrial is an ap-
propriate remedy if the judgment is vitiated by improper instructions on one
of the questions or by improper direction of verdict on an issue; and whether
and under what circumstances an appellate court, reversing the submission
of a question to the jury, should enter judgment on the basis of other factual
findings," 8 in lieu of having the entire case retried because of the possibility
of interrelated answers. No standards seem to have developed on either issue.
Finally, and most important, the case law on Rule 49 has developed almost
no standards to guide the discretion of the trial judge in deciding whether to
order a special verdict on his own motion n9 or on that of a party. Judge
Jerome Frank, a staunch supporter of mandatory use of the special verdict,
articulated the general rule that the trial judge has unlimited discretion:
[T]he federal district judge, under the Rule, has full, uncontrolled dis-
cretion in the matter. He may still require merely the old fashioned
general verdict.
Accordingly, we cannot hold that a district judge errs when, as here, for
any reason or no reason whatever, he refuses to demand a special verdict,
although we deem such a verdict usually preferable to the opaque general
verdict. 20
Though there is a small group of opinions which discuss the question of when
special verdicts should be used, most of them are couched in very broad and
general language, and communicate only attitudes, not standards.12 There
117. See 5 MooRE, FE:DRAL PRAcricE 1 52.03, at 2609-36 (2d ed. 1951).
118. See "Impact of the use of special verdicts on the problem of expense and delay,"
at note 50 supra.
119. It is clear that a court can order a special verdict on its own motion. Cf. note 91
sup ra.
120. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.RLR, 167 F.2d 54, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 816 (1948).
121. See, e.g., Hand, J., concurring in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., stipra note
120, at 70. See also Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota
Rules, 36 Mm. L REv. 672, 682-86 (1952).
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have been a few partial exceptions to this rule. The Seventh Circuit has sug-
gested that the procedure is not useful where the pleadings raise but a single
issue.1 22 Apparently the court felt that the chief value of the special verdict lies
in its potential for bringing some focus to the issues of fact and for localizing
error. The First and Third Circuits have given some indication that the special
verdict is of the greatest value in the complex case,1 23 but a Ninth Circuit
district judge has stated that, from his experience, the special verdict is of
the least value in a complex case.124 Judge Charles Clark has written that the
special verdict should not be used only as a check on the jury, but rather
should be used to localize error and to save sound portions of a verdict when
the "issues can be clearly and simply differentiated."'12 Beyond these mere
beginnings, the appellate courts have been able to give no guidance to trial
judges.12 6 It appears that the appellate courts, aware of their own lack of
information as to the effects of the various practices, have decided that the
various choices ought to be left to trial judges, in the hope that through their
experience they will have enough of a "feel" in the area to act in an intelligent
fashion.
The almost total failure of the courts to develop standards to guide the
discretion of trial judges under section (a) is also characteristic of section (b).
There have been almost no attempts to create guides to aid in the exercise
of the trial court's discretion whether and when to use the interrogatories.
Although there are some cases which suggest that it is error to submit
questions which require the application of a legal definition,12 7 the general
rule is that the trial judge may submit questions going to evidentlary or ul-
timate fact. 2 8 The opinions generally indicate that the number and form of
the questions is in the sole discretion of the trial courts.120 However, there
are some cases which suggest that it is improper to submit a question going
122. See Cohen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1943).
123. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F2d 950, 959-60 (1st Cir. 1952);
Wilson v. Homestead Valve Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 792, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denlcd,
349 U.S. 916 (1955) (interrogatories).
124. See Driver, The Special Verdict - Theory and Practice, 26 WASU1. L. Rnv. 21,
25 (1951).
125. Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 187 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1951).
126. Recently the Fifth Circuit has stated that either 49(a) or (b) should be used
when the trial court is sitting on a diversity case and the state law is uncertain or in flu.%
Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1962).
127. See Feldnann v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 F.2d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 1944);
Carpenter v. Baltimore & O.R.R, 109 F.2d 375, 379 (6th Cir. 1940); Gelfand v. Stro-
necker, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 655, 663 (N.D. Ohio 1956), aff'd per curiam, 243 F2d 797 (6th
Cir. 1957). With deference, this position is absurd.
128. Delpit v. Nocuba Shipping Co., 302 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S,
915 (1962) ; St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Simons, 176 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1949). This is clearly
the correct rule. Cf. McCandless v. L. G. De Felice & Son, 144 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa,
1956).
129. See Thorp v. American Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co., 212 F.2d 821, 830 (3d Cir.
1954) ; DeEugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1954).
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to an issue which the jury need not resolve in reaching its general verdict ;
but it is not clear whether the submission of such a question always, some-
times, or never, constitutes reversible error. When an answer against the vic-
torious party would have been inconsistent with the general verdict, there is
some authority for the proposition that the failure to answer shall be taken
as a finding against the party with the burden of proof.131 The better view is
that failure to answer should be corrected either by a new trial, or by having
the jury reconsider the question.1 3 2 The case law does not indicate in what
circumstances either of these is appropriate, nor what instructions should
accompany an order to reconsider.lm
It is not clear whether a trial judge should attempt to construct the process
so that some questions will serve to test answers to others; since section (b)
provides for the situation in which answers are inconsistent with each other
- and there are cases which deal with the problem of inconsistency between
answers - it seems that one interrogatory can be used to test anotherIM
When the answers appear prima facie inconsistent with each other the opinions
do not indicate whether the trial court should try to harmonize the answers,
nor which of the two courses authorized by the rule to meet this problem
should be followed. The problem raised when there is no inconsistency
among the answers, but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict,
has received a great deal of consideration. Appellate opinions indicate that
the trial judge has a duty to make the answers harmonious with the general
verdict, if it is reasonably possible to do so.las But the extent of the judge's
duty and the test of what constitutes irreconcilable disharmony are nowhere
clearly articulated. When the court cannot harmonize the answers with the
general verdict, the case law gives absolutely no guidance as to which of
the three courses authorized by the rule should be followed.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Evils of the Current Status of Rule 49
Practice under Rule 49 in the quarter-century since its adoption has ful-
filled the intention of its drafters in one important respect; the pitfalls of
common-law practice have been successfully abolished, and with one minor
130. See California West. States Life Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 165 F.2d 945, 954 (9th Cir.
1948).
131. Cf. Wayne v. New York Life Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1942). See text
accompanying notes 109-11 supra for criticism of this argument.
132. See Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aff'd, 263 F.2d 437, 448 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denicd, 359 US. 1000 (1959). See
also note 109 supra (discussion of same problems under Rule 49(a)).
133. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra for consideration of this issue.
134. The fact that the rule provides for inconsistent answers seems to indicate that
it envisions testing questions - unless it only has poorly drafted questions in mind.
135. See Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co, 124 F.2d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Bass
v. Dehner, 103 F.2d 28, 34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 580 (1939). Cf. Arnold v.
Panhandle & S. F. Ry., 353 U.S. 360 (1957).
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exception, 80 no new traps have developed. There seems to be little danger
that the outcome of a case will be determined solely because of a procedural
blunder in the use of Rule 49. But, as we have argued, the drafters probably
also expected that with time and experience knowledge about the effects of
the procedures would accumulate, enabling the courts to develop standards
so that trial judges would not have to rely on intuition, whim, and guesswork
in making the decisions of when and how to use 49(a) and (b). The ensuing
case law has fulfilled this expectation in very few respects. On almost every
issue that has arisen, the appellate courts have told their colleagues of the
trial bench only that the decision rests in their sole discretion.
This utter failure of the case law to live up to the drafters' probable ex-
pectations calls for some explanation. The prime cause seems to lie in the
fact that experience with the use of Rule 49 has not led to an accumulation
of knowledge of the effects that the new procedures, and the various possi-
bilities in their implementation, have on the trial process. It is not at all clear
that even those trial judges who frequently make use of Rule 49 have been able
to learn anything by doing so; if there are trial judges who have acquired such
knowledge, they have not communicated it to appellate courts through their
opinions. There has been no empirical research on the effects of the new pro-
cedures, even on those questions which would be relatively susceptible to quan-
titative answers - for example, whether use of Rule 49 increases the chance
of a hung jury. One suspects that the fact that there are many competing
values at stake, and the fact that there has emerged no consensus as to which
are paramount, may have tended to discourage empirical research by depriving
the area of any inherent focus.'3 7 Lack of knowledge, in turn, may be deemed
largely responsible for the retreat of the appellate courts into the language of
absolute discretion. Some appellate judges, self-conscious in their lack of rele-
vant information, may have decided that decisions on the use of Rule 49
should be left to trial courts, on the theory that the latter are at least closer to
the situation in which the procedures are used. Other appellate judges, with-
out making a principled division of institutional competence, may have taken
the tack of discretion out of frustration in their attempts to discuss and reach
agreement on the proper use of the various procedures and to articulate work-
able standards to guide the discretion of trial judges - a frustration caused by
their conscious ignorance of the effects any given procedure would have on
the values at stake.
The monotonous regularity with which appellate courts invoke the "sole
discretion of the trial judge" on questions of Rule 49 practice comes to have
136. The unique requirement that a party must take exception to the failure of the
court to submit a question demanded to preserve his right of appeal, see note 89 .rupra,
may be troublesome but it is not as serious as the pitfalls in the common-law practice.
137. The contrast between setting out to research cancer and setting out to research
"poverty" will illustrate this difficulty. In the former case, unanimity concerning the values
at stake provides the research with inherent focus. In the latter case, the welter of Incon-
sistent values at stake would make the initiation of research terribly difficult: one would
not know what to look for, nor what its significance was if he found it.
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the flavor of a litany pronounced in lieu of a consideration of the issues in-
volved in an appeal. In reading appellate opinions in this area, one develops
the feeling that although lack of sufficient knowledge to make decisions on
the proper exercise of discretion under Rule 49 is the basic cause, it is not
the only explanation for the current appellate treatment of Rule 49 questions.
It seems that the phrase is now often used out of mere habit, rather than out
of an ongoing appraisal of the actual possibilities for the creation of standards.
The fact that few standards for the proper use of Rule 49 have developed
leaves the rule a potential source of serious problems for federal judicial ad-
ministration. The frustration which must mark appellate consideration of
the problems surrounding Rule 49 is probably even more prevalent at the
district court level. A trial judge, realizing that decisions on Rule 49 questions
may affect the outcome of litigation, may feel incapacitated by his lack of
knowledge and guidance from making intelligent choices on whether and how
to use the rule. Such a judge, who probably represents the majority of federal
district judges, is faced with the unsettling reality of having to make such
decisions "in his sole discretion": that is, on the basis of mere assumptions
as to the effects the possibilities open to him will have, and with the knowl-
edge that his decisions will be virtually final. Even the judge who believes
himself capable of making such empirical predictions is hardly in a better
position; he must still make broad value judgments concerning the status and
nature of the jury in civil trials without any guidance from the appellate courts.
Although some judges may relish the opportunity, the majority probably feel
that this is not a task appropriately left to their virtually unlimited discretion.
This delegation of responsibility to trial judges not only puts them in an
uncomfortable predicament; it also runs counter to the principle that the duty
to make decisions involving broad questions of social policy should rest ulti-
mately with appellate courts. The result of this misallocation leaves each judge
to enforce his own notions of social policy, often without the benefit of knowl-
edge of the actual effects his decision will have on the relevant policies. But
the idiosyncracies of a particular trial judge should not be a crucial factor
in determining the legal rights of the parties, nor should a legal system which
subscribes to the principle of equal justice under law tolerate a situation
in which critical decisions in a lawsuit turn on the fortunity of the forum
where it is heard.
If the current state of uninformed speculation appeared inevitable, it might
be best to follow the suggestion of Justices Black and Douglas and to abolish
Rule 49,L38 not because the two procedures serve no function but because
the present situation of unguided discretion is entirely unsatisfactory to the
courts and to litigants and because the general verdict is the most familiar
mode of procedure. But the past twenty-five years notwithstanding, it is not
clear that the knowledge necessary to begin a realistic evaluation of the pro-
138. See Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Air. Justice Douglas re the 1963 Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 865, 867
(1963).
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cedures is unobtainable or that no standards can be developed. The first pre-
requisite to any constructive development is a change in attitude on the part
of those appellate judges whose positions on the proper use of Rule 49 are
based entirely upon unchallenged assumptions, and on the part of those who
have come to repeat almost automatically the litany that all questions under
Rule 49 are in the sole discretion of the trial courts.
There are a number of ways in which the information necessary for mean-
ingful appellate consideration of Rule 49 can be obtained. The most obvious
method of determining the varying effects upon the deliberations of jurors of
general verdicts, special verdicts, and interrogatories, and the possible alter-
native practices under each form of verdict, is to listen to those deliberations
in real cases without the knowledge of the jurors. Because of the serious
objections to this mode of inquiry,139 other means of obtaining equivalent
information, such as questioning jurors after the termination of the case and
studying mock jury trials might be used. 40 But the results of such alterna-
tive means will require careful evaluation for their reliability as reflections of
what actually transpires during actual jury deliberations.
Information of a different sort may be gathered by carefully controlled
comparative statistical surveys. The questions to be answered are numerous.
For example, how often is appeal taken on the basis of the form or content
of the questions used with the special verdict and the general verdict with in-
terrogatories? How often is a new trial granted under each of the three pro-
cedures? Is partial new trial, when used, appreciably faster than the full new
trial which follows the reversal of a general verdict? What are the compara-
tive percentages of hung juries? What impact does the use of each of the
139. Galston, Civil fJury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.B.A.J. 195, 198 (1943), sug-
gests that a transcription of the jury-room deliberations be made and filed with the ver-
dict. (This may be the logical extension of special interrogatories.) He posits that "there
is no good reason why verdicts should be shrouded in secrecy anymore than are the find-
ings by the court sitting without a jury." Ibid. He further suggests that the name of the
juror making a specific remark need not be recorded. Judge Frank, in CouiTS oN TIAL
144 (1949), endorsed the proposal to the extent of saying that it "deserves consideration."
There was, however, a good deal of controversy stirred when the jury project of the
University of Chicago attempted to record jury deliberations. Hearings on S. Res. 58
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary ("Recording
of Jury Deliberations"), 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5-7, 8, 44-46, 57-62, 186-90 (1955). These
hearings led to the addition of a section of the criminal code making it punishable by fine
and/or imprisonment to record or attempt to record the proceedings of any grand or petit
jury in any court of the United States while such jury is deliberating. 70 Stat. 935 (1956),
18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1958). Although the enactment applies only to the federal courts, the
public reaction to the Chicago project has undoubtedly foreclosed any similar attempt in
the near future.
140. The jury project at the University of Chicago Law School has done this. See
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1964); Kalven, Report on
the Jury Project, in CONFERENCE ON Anis AND METHoDs oF LEGAL IzEsnAcu 155 (Con-
ard ed. 1955); :Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Nx. L. Ruv. 744
(1959). See note 139 suPra.
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three procedures have on results? The methodological difficulties involved
in collecting significant statistics are complicated by the large number of
variables involved. There would be little if any value in comparing, for ex-
ample, the special verdict and the general verdict, without taking into account
such factors as the way in which each is implemented (e.g., use of omnibus
questions, instructions on the law to be applied), the type of law suit involved,
the complexity of the issues, and so forth.
Trial judges are another potential source of the information necessary to
begin an evaluation of the procedures. If trial judges, by observation or by
intuition, can gather any reliable information they should be encouraged to
communicate their findings to the appellate courts. Those judges who were
members of the trial bar before they took the bench may be able to give
valuable insight into the process of jury deliberations. Communication from
trial judges to appellate courts can be accomplished informally during judicial
conferences and by appellate encouragement of opinion-writing on the subject
by trial judges. In those cases in which a trial court's decisions on whether
and how to use Rule 49 are challenged by a party, appellate courts might
reasonably require the trial judge to write an opinion justifying his decisions.'14
The danger that such a requirement might lead only to boiler-plate opinions
because of the pressures of congested trial dockets could be overcome by a
spirit of cooperation on the part of trial judges.
Because it is impossible to make an a priori judgment that one or another
of the three procedures is of no value, it is essential that all of them be used
in order to furnish the informational basis necessary for rational develop-
ment of standards for their use. Otherwise decisions would have to be made
on the basis of the inadequate information heretofore gathered and upon
mock cases. Additionally, if only one of the procedures were used until sensible
standards could be developed - and the procedure retained would inevitably
be the traditional and firmly entrenched general verdict - interest in gath-
ering information on the others would probably wane and the legal profession
would lapse into the complacent acceptance of the general verdict from which
the commentators jarred it loose.
The two immediate objectives of retaining all three procedures are to collect
and evaluate information on their effects and to initiate the development of
and experimentation with standards to govern their use. The first objective
requires that each type of verdict, and all of the possible practices under each,
receive sufficient use in all kinds of cases to afford a substantial basis for
comparison and analysis. Since a mechanical system which would guarantee
the accomplishment of an equal allocation would be nearly impossible to
devise and would tend to frustrate the implementation of experimental stand-
141. Of course, such justificatory opinions should not be required with respect to de-
cisions which the appellate court decides are within the range of proper trial court dis-
cretion. On the other hand, until that range is itself delimited, one of the functions of trial
court opinions would be to suggest where non-reviewability is appropriate.
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ards, trial judges can only be encouraged to use all the practices in all types
of cases, subject to such standards as the appellate courts have been able to
formulate. It is the appellate bench which must accomplish the second ob-
jective. Even if there is not enough information at present to reach firm con-
clusions, the appellate courts should begin to devise tentative guides and
standards. These experimental standards must be constantly re-evaluated
by the courts; they must not be allowed to become rigid, and should be
treated only as tentative attempts based on incomplete information.
As the data becomes more complete, the appellate courts should undertake
to create more permanent and comprehensive guides for trial courts. This
may be the most difficult job of all. The values at stake are many - among
them are reduction of expense to litigants and of delay in the trial and appellate
dockets, public confidence in trial by jury and in the legal process, rationality
of the trial process, accuracy in fact-finding, sophistication in the application
of law to facts, mitigation of harsh laws by a group of laymen, and dispen-
sation of equity justice. There is not, and probably never can be, any agree-
ment in the abstract as to how much importance should be attributed to each
of the various values. But it does seem possible that when faced with con-
crete practical questions some consensus could be reached. For example, all
would agree that a procedure which greatly increased the speed and decreased
the cost of litigation and which had no effect on the role of the jury would
be an improvement in the system. Should time prove the assumptions of the
commentators true, then the basic choice between the traditional central role of
the jury and the drastically limited role advocated by the commentators will
have to be faced. As long as there are men like Moore and Wigmore on one
side and Frank and Sunderland on the other, consensus on this issue will
never be reached. At that point, the courts charged with the responsibility
for supervising federal procedure will simply have to make a very basic choice.
ROBERT DUDNIK*




Rule 49. Special Verdicts and Interrogatories.
(a) SPECIAL VERDIcTs. The court may require a jury to return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of
fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions sus-
ceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms
of the several special findings which might properly be made under the plead-
ings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues
and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The
court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the
matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its
findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to
a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he de-
mands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to
have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) GENERAL VERDicT AccoMPANIED By ANswER To INTERROGATORIES.
The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a
general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the
decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explana-
tion or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make an-
swers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court
shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general
verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the ap-
propriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more
is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant
to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general ver-
dict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent
with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general
verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new
trial. [FED. R. Civ. P. 49 (as amended, 1963).]
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